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V. ABSTRACT  
People can disengage from their internalized moral standards and self-regulation in order to 
perform immoral behaviour by using different Moral Disengagement mechanisms. These 
mechanisms within media have a positive effect on immoral behaviour. However, Moral 
Identity activation is said to counter arguments of Moral Disengagement. In this study, both 
concepts are applied to the context of war. An additional assumption took into account in how 
far participants’ internalized moral standards consider war as immoral. This is important since 
Moral Identity and Moral Disengagement are based on internalized moral standards. 
To test the hypotheses, this study employed a 2 x 2 RO between-subjects factorial design. The 
trait variable called Moral Consideration of War was supposed to reflect participants’ 
internalized moral standards with regard to war. It was used to operationalize the additional 
assumption. Factor 1 varied the activation of Moral Identity (Moral Identity activation versus 
control group) and factor 2 varied the depiction of the war scenario (Permissive Scenario 
versus Prohibitive Scenario). Scenarios were fictive newspaper articles. A Permissive 
Scenario comprised a higher number of arguments based on Moral Disengagement 
mechanisms than a Prohibitive Scenario. Main outcome measures were the support of war and 
war-related Moral Disengagement (questionnaire). In total 86 participants (f=45, m=41) were 
randomized into four cells and completed the online experiment. 
The Permissive Scenario failed to increase support of war and Moral Disengagement 
(questionnaire), on the assumption that war is considered immoral. Moral Identity activation 
had a negative effect on Moral Disengagement only on the assumption that war was 
considered moral. Moral Identity activation had no significant effect on support of war, on the 
premise that war was considered immoral. The interaction term of Moral Identity activation 
and Permissive Scenario had no significant effect neither on support of war nor on Moral 
Disengagement, no matter if additional assumption was taken into account or not.  
Results are discussed with regard to methodological limitations measuring internalized moral 
standards. Their measurement implied already individual Moral Disengagement. Interaction 
effect failed, supposedly because Moral Identity activation was not specifically targeted at 
immoral behaviour and because mediating effects of Moral Identity centrality were not 
considered. 
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VI. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die Mechanismen der Moralischen Entkopplung lösen das Selbst von internalisierten 
moralischen Standards und verhindern damit die Selbstregulierung des moralischen 
Verhaltens. Diese Mechanismen kommen auch in Medien vor und tragen zu unmoralischem 
Verhalten bei. Die Aktivierung der Moralischen Identität wirkt jedoch den Mechanismen der 
Moralischen Entkopplung entgegen. In dieser Studie werden beide Konzepte auf das Thema 
Krieg übertragen. Dabei ist wichtig zu beachten, dass internalisierte moralische Standards 
Krieg als unmoralisch bewerten. Schließlich basieren sowohl Moralische Entkopplung als 
auch die Aktivierung der Moralischen Identität auf dieser zusätzlichen Annahme.  
Zur Überprüfung der Hypothesen wurde ein 2 x 2 RO Between-Subjects Design verwendet. 
Faktor 1 variierte die Aktivierung von Moralischer Identität (Aktivierung Moralische Identität 
versus Kontrollgruppe). Faktor 2 variierte die Permissivität eines Kriegsszenarios in einem 
Zeitungsartikel (Permissives Szenario versus Prohibitives Szenario). Dabei wurde 
Permissivität hinsichtlich der Anzahl der Moralischen Entkopplungsmechanismen 
operationalisiert (Viele versus Wenig). Als Organismusvariable ist die Moralische Bewertung 
von Krieg zur Überprüfung der zusätzlichen Annahme notwendig gewesen. Abhängige 
Variablen waren die Unterstützung von Krieg und Moralische Entkopplung (Fragebogen). 
Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer (N=86, f=45, m=41) des online Experiments wurden in vier 
verschiedene Versuchsbedingungen randomisiert.  
Die Ergebnisse zeigten, dass die Permissivität des Kriegsszenarios keinen Effekt auf 
Moralische Entkopplung (Fragebogen) oder die Unterstützung von Krieg hatte, unter 
Berücksichtigung der Zusatzannahme. Moralische Identitätsaktivierung verringerte 
Moralische Entkopplung (Fragebogen) aber nur unter der Bedingung, dass Krieg als 
moralisch bewertet wurde. Moralische Entkopplung hatte keinen Effekt auf die Unterstützung 
von Krieg, unter Berücksichtigung der Zusatzannahme. Die Interaktion von Moralischer 
Identitätsaktivierung mit der Permissivität des Kriegsszenarios war nicht signifikant, 
unabhängig davon ob die Zusatzannahme berücksichtigt wurde oder nicht.  
Die Ergebnisse werden in Bezug auf die methodischen Probleme bei der Messung 
internalisierter moralischer Standards diskutiert. Es fanden vermutlich Prozesse der 
Moralischen Entkopplung bereits während der Messung dieser Standards statt. Der fehlende 
Interaktionseffekt kann an der schwachen und unspezifischen Aktivierung der Moralischen 
Identität liegen, sowie nicht berücksichtigter Mediatoren, wie z.B. die Zentralität von 
Moralischer Identität.   
  
10 
1 INTRODUCTION  
War is a cruel endeavour: the public record of violent deaths following the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq documented more than 120 000 civilian deaths from war-related violence (IBC, 2003-
2014). However, the knowledge of those numbers does not automatically lead to a complete 
rejection of war. Instead, people are appealed to war on certain conditions, e.g. if those 
numbers are compared against even more severe consequences. When war is inherently 
connected to death and devastation, why do politicians, soldiers and ordinary citizens support 
military interventions in other countries? The second central questions for this research is 
about which factors could possibly diminish support of war? 
Psychology tries to answer these questions with different approaches. For the first question a 
concept called Moral Disengagement will be focused. This concept refers to a situation where 
a person maintains a positive view of his or her moral self even when engaging in immoral 
behaviour (Bandura, 1999; McAlister, Bandura, & Owen, 2006). With different Moral 
Disengagement mechanisms a person can reconstruct the reality of war: by distracting from 
negative consequences, by emphasizing the moral obligation to prevent genocide, by calling 
victims of the war inhumane terrorists and by displacing responsibility of the actions to higher 
authorities. Thereby news media have a decisive impact on this reconstruction of reality 
because media comprise arguments similar to Moral Disengagement (Bandura, 2002). This 
study will explain how Moral Disengagement within media increases individual support of 
war. 
Regarding the second question about factors that could diminish support of war, the 
psychological concept of Moral Identity holds valuable answers (Aquino, Reed, Thau, & 
Freeman, 2007). If Moral Identity is activated, a person is more attentive to his or her moral 
behaviour and maintenance of a positive view on his or her moral self. Therefore, the person 
does not easily employ abovementioned mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and is 
consequently less prone to support war. It will be investigated in this study if Moral Identity 
activation counters the effect of Moral Disengagement in media, too. 
The concepts of Moral Disengagement and Moral Identity are proposed to be two sides of the 
same coin. Moral Disengagement is supposed to increase support of war, whereby Moral 
Identity counteracts Moral Disengagement. These theoretical considerations will be 
challenged experimentally. This study probes the concept of Moral Identity. Does its 
activation reduce the effect of Moral Disengagement in media? Further, this study seeks to 
  
11 
contribute to answering in how far Moral Disengagement mechanisms within media actually 
change people’s support for military interventions and war. Answers to those questions would 
be valuable for journalists and bloggers especially when considering how often military 
interventions were part of the public discourse in the last years.  
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2 THEORY 
The two key questions for this research are: a) why people support immoral behaviour? b) 
Which factors could possibly diminish this support? The theory is divided in five main 
sections. The first two sections target the first key question. It will be explained how Moral 
Disengagement increases immoral behaviour and more specifically support of war (2.1). The 
next section (2.2) concentrates on Moral Disengagement in media and proposes that media are 
likely to employ arguments similar to Moral Disengagement when covering topics of war. 
The third section (2.3) gives an insight into Moral Identity and its activation targeting the 
second key question. It will be explained how Moral Identity counteracts Moral 
Disengagement and thus reduces immoral behaviour and the support of war. The fourth 
section (2.4) sums up theoretical considerations deducting the hypotheses for this study. The 
fifth and last section (2.5) of this chapter explains reasons for this study.  
2.1  MORAL DISENGAGEMENT 
The main hypothesis of this section is that Moral Disengagement increases immoral 
behaviour. The rationale behind this prediction is based on Bandura’s (1999) Socio Cognitive 
Theory of Morality. Therefore, this theory and Moral Disengagement mechanisms will be 
explained in the following two subsections (2.1.1 and 2.1.2). The third subsection (2.1.3) will 
link Moral Disengagement to the support of war. 
2.1.1 SOCIO COGNITIVE THEORY OF MORALITY 
According to Bandura (1999) and his theoretical considerations, morality is embedded in a 
broader “socio cognitive self-theory” (p.193) and guides behaviour: while early in life 
morality is dictated by external agents, e.g. parents and relatives, it is later internalized 
through socialization and cognitive processes (Bandura & McDonald, 1963). After 
internalization morality constitutes a self-regulatory, self-reflective and proactive process, 
guiding and self-sanctioning behaviour. People monitor their behaviour and anticipate 
external (social environment) or internal reward and punishment. Cognitive dissonance and 
hence distress, shame and guilt arise when actual behaviour does not align with internalized 
moral standards and beliefs. An example for this may be a situation where a person supports a 
war though he or she always has been pacifist (Festinger, 1962). Behaving in line with 
internalized moral standards through self-regulation of behaviour and sanctioning avoids 
distress caused by cognitive dissonance and produces feelings of self-worth instead (Bandura, 
1991, 1999). Nevertheless, self-regulation and sanctioning processes may be prevented by 
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Moral Disengagement: people can disengage from their internalized moral standards and self-
regulation in order to perform immoral behaviour and at the same time alleviate cognitive 
dissonance, shame and guilt (Bandura, 1999; Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer, 2008). 
Bandura (1991, 1999) suggests that it depends on an implicit cost-benefit-analysis, whether it 
would be more costly to act morally (self-sanctioning and self-regulation) or to disengage 
from one’s internalized moral standard (Moral Disengagement) in the pursuit of personal 
goals.  
2.1.2 MECHANISMS OF MORAL DISENGAGEMENT 
People may disengage from internal moral standards and thus from immoral behaviour 
through six different Moral Disengagement mechanisms (Bandura, 1999): a) reconstruction of 
the situation involving the immoral behaviour (= moral justification); b) making a bad thing 
look good and downgrading possible negative consequences (=advantageous comparison); c) 
using euphemistic language (euphemistic wording); d) play down one’s own involvement (= 
diffusion of responsibility); e) displace one’s responsibility; f) devaluate the victims of the 
action (= dehumanization and attribution of blame). These mechanisms act in concert. They 
modify beliefs and reduce cognitive dissonance (Bandura, 1999).  
In a first cross-sectional study (N=799), Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, Pastorelli and 
Concetta (1996) have shown the positive relationship between Moral Disengagement and 
aggressive behaviour of kids in high school and elementary school. In order to measure the 
different Moral Disengagement mechanisms, Bandura et al. (1996) developed the Moral 
Disengagement Scale. Study participants scoring high on the Moral Disengagement scale 
were also more aggressive. Aggressive kids employed the Moral Disengagement mechanisms 
more often. Bandura et al. (1996) conclude that people who use Moral Disengagement 
mechanisms, disengage from internalized moral standards and self-regulative behaviour. They 
are able to conduct immoral behaviour by cognitive reconstruction (Bandura et al., 1996).  
The positive relationship between immoral behaviour and Moral Disengagement has been 
demonstrated in many studies with different contexts (Bandura, 2002; Bandura et al., 1996; 
Cohrs, 2008; Detert et al., 2008; Jackson, 2005b; Grussendorf, McAlister, Sandström, Udd, & 
Morrison, 2002). Moral Disengagement was transferred to the domain of war, too (Aquino et 
al., 2007; Bandura, 1999; McAlister, 2001; McAlister et al., 2006).  
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2.1.3 MORAL DISENGAGEMENT AND WAR 
War is a situation where Moral Disengagement is likely to happen by its supporters and also 
by soldiers (Aquino et al., 2007; Grossman, 1995). Warfare most of the time involves human 
suffering and deaths not only of combatants, but also of innocent civilians. This is why 
negative feelings are often intuitively associated with war and war supporters have to justify 
their standpoint.
1
 Bandura (1999) hypothesises that a radical change from e.g. a pacifist mind 
into a supporter for military action does not involve the rapid alteration of the personality 
structure or an increase of aggressiveness. It rather involves a “re-defini[tion of] the morality” 
(p.195) of military action involving abovementioned Moral Disengagement mechanisms 
(McAlister, 2001; McAlister et al., 2006). These mechanisms will be explained more detailed 
in the following. 
a) Moral Justification 
This mechanism serves the cognitive reconstruction of the harmful behaviour, portraying it as 
serving socially acceptable and worthy or moral ends. Thus, the harmful behaviour transforms 
to a moral imperative. One example may be human rights violations that can be stopped by 
military means (Bandura, 1999). Instead of pointing out that a military intervention causes 
harm and suffer, positive and morally acceptable results are underlined. A positive result of a 
military intervention such as prevention of human rights violations would be then a way to 
legitimize immoral behaviour.  
b) Advantageous Comparison 
This is a mechanism of making a bad thing look good simply by comparing it to a greater evil. 
This contrasting principle often relies on utilitarian standards and helps to reduce the 
harmfulness of one’s own behaviour (Bandura, 1999). For instance, if a military intervention 
is likely to kill only 1000 opponent soldiers, but can prevent a genocide of millions instead. 
This example implies that a genocide will happen (greater evil) if there is no military 
intervention. Possible negative consequences can be distorted, minimized or simply ignored in 
order to serve an advantageous comparison. In the example the possibility of civilian 
casualties is ignored. Further, the word only implies a distortion and reduction of the value of 
a human life.  
c) Euphemistic Wording 
                                                 
1
 There is, however, the possibility that a person associates positive thoughts and feelings with war depending on 
whether these different standards were internalized through socialization. This will be addressed below. 
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This mechanism distorts the truth of an action through wording. Different words with the 
same meaning may appear less harmful, more respectable and positively or negatively 
connoted. Sanitizing language camouflages the actual intention or meaning of an action 
(Bandura, 1999). An example would be to describe a war as a quick and harmless rescue 
operation with little collateral damage. In this study euphemistic wording is present, too. E.g. 
because the word military intervention and the word war are used interchangeably. Even 
though it is arguable if those two terms mean precisely the same, they do suggest two 
different connotations (more positive = military intervention, more negative = war). 
d) Diffusion of Responsibility 
This mechanism proposes that moral control is weakened through the diffusion of 
accountability when different parties or people work on one higher goal. Due to the 
subdivision of labour, individuals concentrate on the moral worth of their own work which is 
considered seemingly less harmless than the whole operation. One example would be that my 
own country is anyway only one of many others that carry out the military intervention. Plus 
my country provides only non-military support. Diffusion of responsibility is found in group 
decision making, too. In a group nobody really feels responsible and accountability may be 
attributed to the other group members (Bandura, 1999; Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 
1975; Zimbardo, 1969). 
e) Displacement of Responsibility 
Displacement of responsibility means that people are not the actual agent of the immoral 
behaviour because order came from a superior legitimate authority. The Milgram experiments 
show that in case an authority takes over full responsibility for one’s action that 
aggressiveness and harmful behaviour increase (Bandura, 1999; Milgram, 1975). A political 
equivalent would be that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approves a military 
intervention by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. In this example 
responsibility is delegated to the UNSC and diffused by the amount of NATO members 
(diffusion of responsibility). 
f) Dehumanization and Attribution of Blame 
This mechanism relies on how people view the victims of the immoral behaviour. Self-
censure and regulation of conduct are reduced when victims are denied human qualities. 
When another person is not viewed human and devaluated to a savage, without feelings, 
thoughts and hope, there is no need to treat him like a human (Bandura, 1999). This is 
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because a ‘non-human’ will not be able to feel the maltreatment (Bandura et al., 1975). An 
example is that victims of a military intervention are depicted as ruthless followers of the 
dictator and ‘inhuman’ terrorists. Further, blame can be attributed to the victim. It is more 
likely that a “non-human” deserved the maltreatment (Bierhoff, 2002). The consequence are 
feelings “[…] of self-righteousness and justification on the side of the perpetrator” (p.4, 
Jackson, 2005). On the other hand humanization is a powerful way to withhold people from 
cruel action (Bandura et al., 1975). In the Milgram experiments, participants refused from 
inflicting pain upon others through direct personal action rather than remotely done (Bandura, 
1999; Milgram, 1975). 
Moral Disengagement mechanisms in the context of war and the support of war found 
evidence in a study by McAlister et al. (2006) and a study by Aquino et al. (2007). These 
studies will be explained in the following. 
McAlister et al. (2006) conducted a study (N=1499) with two randomly selected samples 
before (N=1000) and after 11
th
 September 2001 (N=499). The two samples were comparable 
with regard to gender, race and age. Participants were supposed to evaluate items derived 
from abovementioned Moral Disengagement mechanisms, for instance: military force is 
legitimate when diplomacy and negotiations drag on without resolving conflict (= moral 
justification) or terrorists do not deserve to be treated like human beings (= dehumanization). 
The support of immoral behaviour was operationalized with the support of war, more 
precisely the support of military campaigns in Iraq after the attacks against the World Trade 
Centre. Comparing the two samples before and after the attacks, McAlister et al. (2006) 
observed that Moral Disengagement scores mediated the support for military campaigns. 
Support of immoral behaviour (support of war) and Moral Disengagement correlated 
positively. McAlister et al. (2006) were able to show that Moral Disengagement does not only 
apply to one’s own immoral behaviour, but also to the support of immoral behaviour (support 
of war). 
Study 1 by Aquino et al. (2007) found similar findings. University participants (N=104) were 
asked about personality variables such as Moral Identity centrality as well as Moral 
Disengagement (time 1). Three months later, judgments of punitive responses to the 9/11 
attacks were recorded for the same participants (time 2). Results show a positive relationship 
between Moral Disengagement and highly punitive responses against 9/11 attackers.  
  
17 
Both studies state a positive relationship between Moral Disengagement and support of 
immoral behaviour related to war. However, these two studies include an implicit assumption 
regarding Moral Disengagement and the support of war. For Moral Disengagement to happen 
it is theoretically necessary that the behaviour is actually judged immoral by a person, too. In 
the case of war, internalized moral standards would need to condemn war. Otherwise this 
person would not have to disengage from self-regulation and internalized moral standards. He 
or she would then be a person who generally associates positive feelings, attitudes and 
thoughts with war. Examples from history and today illustrate the possibility that cultures, 
societies and groups can indeed be different regarding internalized moral standards. In heroic 
fighting cultures and war cultures of armies (e.g. Spartan army) or criminal gangs such as 
Mara Salvatrucha and Los Zetas, violence and war have a different connotation when serving 
the well-being of the group or an ideology (Staub, 1992). Accordingly, this study will include 
an additional assumption in the hypotheses and statistical analysis. It is about what is 
considered moral and immoral. Moral Disengagement in the context of war occurs only if war 
is generally judged immoral. The additional assumption refers to internalized moral standards 
operationalized by using a Moral Consideration of War scale (see subsection 3.2.1.1).  
In summary, it was explained on a theoretical level how different Moral Disengagement 
mechanisms within a person justify the support of immoral behaviour. These mechanisms 
disengage the self from internalized moral standards and self-regulation. Empirical research 
has shown that Moral Disengagement occurs when people support war (Aquino et al., 2007; 
McAlister et al., 2006) implying that internalized moral standards refer to war as something 
immoral. Otherwise there would be no need to disengage.  
In the abovementioned studies by Aquino et al. (2007) and McAlister et al. (2006), Moral 
Disengagement with regard to war is measured by a questionnaire. How could Moral 
Disengagement be varied experimentally so that its causal effect on immoral behaviour 
(support of war) can be tested? A possible answer lies in mass media which are an important 
information source influencing people’s behaviour and opinions (Bandura, 2002). Therefore, 
the next section will look at Moral Disengagement mechanisms within media to see its effects 
on immoral behaviour and the support of war.  
2.2  MORAL DISENGAGEMENT AND MEDIA 
Personal opinions and behaviour are influenced by everyday exposure to mass media 
(Bandura, 2002). One obvious example would be how commercials are highly influencing 
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people´s consumption behaviour (see for instance Vakratsas & Ambler, 1999). The main 
hypothesis of this section is that Moral Disengagement mechanisms within media can foster 
immoral behaviour (support of war), too. The rationale for this prediction will be explained in 
the following: the first goal is to examine how media influence aggressive behaviour with the 
help of Moral Disengagement mechanisms (subsection 2.2.1). The second goal is to suggest a 
relationship between Moral Disengagement in media on the one hand and war on the other by 
introducing the Theory of Just War (subsection 2.2.2). The third goal is to show how Moral 
Disengagement can be varied experimentally in newspaper articles about war (subsection 
2.2.3). 
2.2.1 MORAL DISENGAGEMENT IN MEDIA AND AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOUR 
Moral Disengagement in mass media can trigger immoral behaviour due to observational 
learning and persuasion (Bandura, 2002; Berkowitz, 1984). There has been research in which 
the different Moral Disengagement mechanisms are systematically varied in media portrayals 
of inhumanities (Berkowitz, 1984; Berkowitz & Rawlings, 1963; Meyer, 1972). When the 
viewer is exposed to media that morally justifies harmful behaviour, blames and dehumanizes 
victims, displaces or diffuses personal responsibility and misconstrues negative consequences, 
then the viewer’s immoral behaviour increases likewise. In other words the viewer’s immoral 
behaviour has been released due to the Moral Disengagement mechanisms within the media 
(Bandura, 2002). Empirical evidence comes from older studies on media and aggressive 
behaviour. One study by Meyer (1972) will be explained in the following.  
Meyer (1972) randomized university students (N=200) into different groups. All participants 
watched a real video depicting violent acts of South Vietnamese against North Vietnamese 
during the Vietnam War. Groups heard different voice tracks of the video, either justifying or 
not justifying the violent acts. Justification included the dehumanization of the victim, too. 
Dependent measures were the number and intensity of electro shocks returned to an 
accomplice’s composition. Results of the study show that the group watching the justified 
violence video returned more intensive shocks and shocked more often the accomplice than 
the group watching the not justified violence video (Meyer, 1972). Meyer (1972) explains that 
moral justification on the voice tracks had a reinforcing effect on participants’ subsequent 
aggressive behaviour. Reinforcement increases the likelihood that the behaviour will occur 
again. Participants observed that violent behaviour was not punished and conducted violent 
behaviour themselves. This is observational learning: when other aggressive behaviour is 
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rewarded through justification and absence of punishment, then the probability of subsequent 
personal aggression is increased (Bandura et al., 1975).  
Other studies e.g. by Berkowitz and Rawlings (1963) observed similar results regarding 
dehumanization of victims of violence and aggression in media (cf. Berkowitz, 1984). 
Explanations emphasize the perceived justification of violence by putting a situation in a good 
or a bad light to the audience. This can also be done by leaving out certain information or by 
emphasizing information differently (cf. Cohrs, 2008; Druckman, 2004). 
To sum up, there is evidence that some Moral Disengagement mechanisms within media 
increase audience’s aggressive behaviour (Berkowitz & Rawlings, 1963; Meyer, 1972). In 
other words and more generally speaking, Moral Disengagement within media has a positive 
effect on subsequent immoral behaviour. The mechanism behind this effect is the reinforcing 
effect of justified immoral behaviour in the media. In the following, it is proposed that Moral 
Disengagement mechanisms within media can be transferred to the domain of war, too.  
2.2.2 MORAL DISENGAGEMENT IN MEDIA AND WAR 
War may appear more or less justified in media and there is a proposed relationship to Moral 
Disengagement mechanisms.  
It was described in subsection 2.2.2 how the usage of Moral Disengagement mechanisms 
serves to support war-related immoral behaviour. Moral Disengagement mechanisms justify 
war through the rational-cognitive reconstruction of the situation (Bandura, 2001; Bandura et 
al., 1996; Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997): for instance when war serves to promote peace 
or to prevent suffering and when peaceful means of conflict resolution are unsuccessful (= 
moral justification + advantageous comparison). Further, if a given member of a group, e.g. a 
soldier, cannot be held accountable for group decisions, then killing appears more legitimate 
(= diffusion of responsibility; compare to items of war-related Moral Disengagement scale by 
McAlister, 2001 and Terrorism Questionnaire by Jackson, 2005; Table 9).  
In a study by Cohrs (2008) Moral Disengagement mechanisms were experimentally varied in 
descriptions of the Kosovo War (N=275). Dependent variable was the attitude to the Kosovo 
War after reading the descriptions. Results show a positive effect of Moral Disengagement 
mechanisms within the description of the war on subsequent war attitudes (Cohrs, 2008). 
The study by Cohrs (2008) shows that Moral Disengagement mechanisms within descriptions 
of war have a positive effect on the support of war, but are Moral Disengagement mechanisms 
present in news media covering war-related topics? Support derives from parallels to political 
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theory. On a national level it is arguable if Moral Disengagement plays much of a role. The 
reasons for one nation to go to war against another are manifold and legitimization is more 
likely to be derived from international law and political considerations. Just War Theory is a 
political theory developed by Roman and Catholic philosophers and sets standards for the 
questions of war and peace in international humanitarian law (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002). The 
theory defines several criteria for a jus ad bellum, i.e. the right to war: 1) The war must be 
based on a right cause, e.g. severe human rights violations happening in a country; 2) right 
intention, meaning that the true intention lies in the establishment of peace or the prevention 
of severe evil; 3) proportionality of the means employed, meaning that the positive outcomes 
outweigh the negative ones; 4) authorized by legitimate authority, e.g. the UN Security 
Council; 5) ultima ratio, meaning that other non-military remedies fail success; and 6) 
probability of success of for instance subsequent peace agreements (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002; 
Moseley, 2009). 
Parallels with regard to contents appear between the political and psychological theories 
comparing Moral Disengagement mechanisms to Just War Theory criteria (see Table 1).  
Table 1: Comparison between Moral Disengagement Mechanisms and Just War Theory 
Criteria, Examples 
Moral Disengagement Mechanisms Just War Theory Criteria Examples 
Moral Justification Right cause Prevent Human Rights 
violations, e.g. Genocide 
Right intention Intervening countries are only 
interested in the right cause 
(no power or economic 
interests) 
Advantageous Comparison Proportionality Genocide is preventable with 
military force causing little 
damage 
Ultima ratio non-military remedies, e.g. 
economic sanctions and 
negotiations, fail success 
Diffusion + Displacement of 
Responsibility 
Legitimization UNSC approves military 
intervention by NATO forces 
Downgrading, Ignoring or 
Misconstruing Negative 
Consequences  
Probability of Success High likelihood of post-war 
peace and prosperity; only 
few potential casualties 
Euphemistic Wording This is differing between the types of news media, e.g. 
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Dehumanization 
tabloid vs. high quality and does not address the content 
of a text or argumentation, but How something is 
represented. For example the word “tribe” can be 
considered something less human and ancient than the 
word “group” (Arndt, Hornscheidt, & Bauer, 2004). 
Because of this and because there is no counterpart in Just 
War Theory criteria, those two mechanisms will not be 
varied. 
 
One parallel is explained in the following example: a military intervention is said to be the 
only way to prevent further human rights violations. Moral justification as one Moral 
Disengagement mechanism is given because the military intervention serves a moral worthy 
end. In terms of Just War Theory criteria, the same point equals the right cause (see Table 1). 
Looking further at Table 1, certain overlaps between the two theories are obvious except for 
euphemistic wording and dehumanization.  
The parallels suggest that Moral Disengagement mechanisms do not only apply for the 
justification of immoral behaviour and the support of war on an individual level, but partly for 
the legitimization of war on a national level, too. Therefore, it is plausible that news media 
comprise argumentation in line with Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Just War Theory 
criteria when covering topics of war. Hence, different scenarios with regard to the 
permissiveness of a war can be operationalized with a better external validity in this study. 
Arguments within the scenarios would not only be based on Moral Disengagement 
mechanisms but also on Theory of Just War criteria.  
2.2.3 OPERATIONALIZATION OF SCENARIOS 
In this study two newspaper articles about a fictive war scenario will be constructed. The 
article appears more permissive regarding the support of war if it comprises many arguments 
based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria (Permissive 
Scenario). The article is prohibitive when only few of these arguments are given (Prohibitive 
Scenario). The permissiveness of the newspaper articles should affect reader’s support of war: 
firstly, because justification in media has a reinforcing effect on the audience’s support of war 
(see subsection 2.2.1; Bandura et al., 1975; Cohrs, 2008; Meyer, 1972). Secondly, it is 
proposed that Moral Disengagement mechanisms within media trigger personal Moral 
Disengagement preventing self-regulation and releasing from internalized moral standards. 
The cognitive reconstruction of the war increases support of war. 
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The Permissive Scenario should foster the recipient’s support of war because arguments 
prevent individual self-regulation and release from internalized moral standards. The reason 
for this is that Moral Disengagement in the Permissive Scenario triggers Moral 
Disengagement within a person. At the same time the justification of war in the Permissive 
Scenario functions as a positive reinforcement for support of war. This mechanism is 
proposed to be similar to observational learning and aggressive behaviour watching justified 
and unjustified violent films (see subsection 2.2.1; Bandura et al., 1975; Meyer, 1972).  
The Prohibitive Scenario instead should decrease recipient’s support of war because self-
regulation is not prevented and internalized moral standards are not disengaged from by 
arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria. At 
the same time positive reinforcement of justification of war is weaker when reading the 
Prohibitive Scenario.  
However, the aforementioned additional assumption needs to be considered, too, because it is 
possible that a person reacts differently to the Permissive and Prohibitive Scenario. Reactions 
depend on a person’s internalized moral standards. A person should consider war as 
something immoral. Otherwise arguments (based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and 
Theory of Just War criteria) would not lead to an increased support of war by the reader of the 
scenario. 
In summary, it was described how Moral Disengagement is used in media increasing 
aggressive behaviour (Meyer, 1972). Further, the parallels between Moral Disengagement 
mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria were explained supporting the idea that Moral 
Disengagement in media can be transferred to the domain of war, too. It was hypothesized 
that many arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War 
criteria in media (Permissive Scenario) have a positive effect on a person’s support of war and 
Moral Disengagement (questionnaire).  
The next section will look at how Moral Disengagement can be prevented or reduced. It is 
hypothesized that Moral Identity activation can work as an instrument to counter arguments of 
Moral Disengagement. 
2.3  MORAL IDENTITY 
The main hypothesis for this section is that Moral Identity activation interacts with Moral 
Disengagement reducing immoral behaviour. This prediction derives from the concept of 
Moral Identity based on the Social-Cognitive Model of Moral Behaviour by Aquino, 
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Freeman, Reed, Lim and Felps (2009): first, Moral Identity is a stable personality 
characteristic called centrality of Moral Identity. Second, Moral Identity can be activated by 
situational cues. Third, this model assumes that Moral Disengagement interacts with Moral 
Identity influencing immoral behaviour. The three premises of the Model will be looked at 
more closely in the following subsections. 
2.3.1 MORAL IDENTITY CENTRALITY 
Moral Identity is the cornerstone of the Social-Cognitive Model of Moral Behaviour. It is 
defined by Aquino et al. (2009, p.124) as a “cognitive schema a person holds about his or her 
moral character”, stored in memory as “a complex knowledge structure”. This knowledge 
structure consists of internalized moral standards, “goals, traits, and behavioural scripts“. The 
knowledge structure is acquired through life experiences (socialization) which are different 
from person to person. This is why Moral Identity can be of more or less centrality within a 
person and differing in its centrality between people (Blasi, 1984). Aquino et al. (2009) 
describe Moral Identity centrality as a stable personality variable. High Moral Identity 
centrality, for instance, exerts greater influence on behaviour and processes that guide 
behaviour because Moral Identity related traits are better accessible (Aquino et al., 2009).  
In the 6
th
 study, Aquino and Reed (2002) investigated the relation of Moral Identity centrality 
to actual moral behaviour. First, 145 university participants were asked to fill out a prior 
version of the Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Reed & Aquino, 2003). This explicit 
10-item questionnaire measures Moral Identity centrality in an internalization and 
symbolization subscale. Subscales refer to the point that Moral Identity comprises a private 
(internalization) and public (symbolization) dimension. Three months later, participants were 
given the opportunity to engage in food donations. Results showed that the internalization 
dimension, i.e. Moral Identity centrality, is positively correlated with the donation.  
The explanation for this finding goes back to abovementioned interpersonal differences in 
Moral Identity centrality and the accessibility of internalized moral standards and traits 
(knowledge structures). Aquino and Reed (2002, p.1424) say that internalized moral standards 
and “moral traits form part of a network of connected components”. Based on the learning 
principle ‘neurons that fire together, wire together’, higher Moral Identity centrality means 
that the moral self-schema (Moral Identity) is activated more easily, more strongly and more 
frequently (Aquino et al., 2009). This higher activation potential (Higgins & Brendl, 1995) 
results from learning, i.e. frequent priming or personality variables acquired during 
socialization, and inherited personality traits (Aquino et al., 2009; Higgins, 1996). This 
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increased activation potential makes Moral Identity more important for the self and is thus 
better accessible exerting greater influence on cognition and moral behaviour (Aquino et al., 
2007; Lapsley & Lasky, 2001). With regard to the study by Aquino and Reed (2002) it is to 
say that participants with a high Moral Identity centrality have better access to their Moral 
Identity, in other words to donation and helping related knowledge structures. They learned 
through socialization that helping and donating is valuable and important for the self-
definition. As a result they engaged in food donations to a greater extent than participants 
with a lower Moral Identity centrality.  
In summary, there is evidence that higher Moral Identity centrality has a positive effect on 
moral behaviour due to the increased accessibility of internalized moral standards and traits. 
Aquino and Reed (2002) proposed that Moral Identity may be externally activated, too, and 
interact with Moral Disengagement reducing immoral behaviour.  
2.3.2 MORAL IDENTITY ACTIVATION AND MORAL DISENGAGEMENT 
Moral Identity can be activated by identity-invoking stimuli (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Aquino 
and Reed (2002) used inductive qualitative methods to find trait-related adjectives that could 
function as situational cues for the activation of Moral Identity. The following adjectives were 
found: caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest and kind. 
These adjectives can be used to activate Moral Identity (Aquino et al., 2009; Aquino et al., 
2007). Aquino and Reed (2002) assumed that not all possible traits constituting Moral Identity 
need to be activated by situational cues, but that the activation of a subset linked to other 
moral traits is sufficient to activate Moral Identity as a whole. Aquino et al. (2009) 
demonstrated that Moral Identity activation with abovementioned adjectives raises Moral 
Identity centrality especially for people who are scoring low on their Moral Identity centrality. 
The effect of Moral Identity activation on cognition and moral behaviour works similar to the 
trait variable of high Moral Identity centrality (Aquino et al., 2009; Aquino et al., 2007). This 
is a major point of the Social-Cognitive Model of Moral Behaviour by Aquino et al. (2009): 
the activation of mental representations of the moral self (Moral Identity) is important for 
processing social information and the guidance of behaviour (Aquino et al., 2007; Lapsley 
& Lasky, 2001).  
The following studies demonstrate first that Moral Identity can be activated by trait-related 
adjectives and second that Moral Identity activation interacts with Moral Disengagement 
influencing war-related immoral behaviour. Afterwards, theoretical explanations will be 
provided.  
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2.3.2.1 Empirical Support for Moral Identity Activation and Moral Disengagement 
In an experimental study by Aquino et al. (2007), participants were randomly assigned either 
to a Moral Identity activation prime condition or a non-Moral Identity activation prime 
condition (study 1). Priming was done with abovementioned trait-related adjectives. 
Participants had to read the adjectives and were asked to associate them with personal 
experiences in a handwriting task. A control group was primed with more neutral adjectives. 
Dependent variables were negative emotional responses to the cruel behaviour of US soldiers. 
Additional measure was advantageous comparison as one Moral Disengagement mechanism. 
Even though manipulation check suggested success of priming procedure, Moral Identity 
activation had no direct effect on the experience of negative emotions. Moral Disengagement 
decreased the experience of negative emotions. However, interaction of Moral Identity 
activation and Moral Disengagement increased the experience of negative emotions. In other 
words, Moral Identity activation neutralized the effect of Moral Disengagement on the 
outcome measure. This study supports the idea that on the on hand Moral Identity can be 
activated by identity-invoking stimuli and on the other that Moral Identity activation counters 
Moral Disengagement.  
Evidence for a similar interaction effect (Moral Disengagement x Moral Identity centrality) 
comes further from a second study by Aquino et al. (2007). As described in subsection 2.1.3 
already, university participants (N=104) were asked about personality variables such as Moral 
Identity centrality as well as Moral Disengagement (time 1). Three months later judgments of 
punitive responses to the 9/11 attacks were recorded for the same participants (time 2). As a 
result interaction effects of Moral Disengagement and Moral Identity centrality show a 
negative relationship on punitive responses. While Moral Disengagement was positively 
related to punitive responses for low moral identifiers, there was no relationship between 
these variables for high moral identifiers. Aquino et al. (2007) say that this result provides 
empirical evidence for the idea that Moral Identity centrality neutralizes the effects of Moral 
Disengagement allowing people to support war-related immoral behaviour.  
2.3.2.2 Explanations for the Interactive Effects of Moral Identity Activation and Moral 
Disengagement 
Aquino et al. (2007) explain the study results with an increased circle of moral regard due to 
prior Moral Identity activation (study 1) or the high Moral Identity centrality (study 2): 
Aquino et al. (2007) and Reed and Aquino (2003) say that people routinely establish group 
boundaries, i.e. a circle of moral regard (Singer, 1981; Staub, 1992). A person feels stronger 
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moral obligation to people within these boundaries (e.g. friends, family or people of the same 
nationality). If Moral Identity is activated or if Moral Identity centrality is high, knowledge 
structures comprising internalized moral standards, traits, goals and behavioural scripts are 
cognitively better accessible. As a result circle of moral regard is more likely to be expanded 
and people take into account the suffering of those officially labelled ‘enemies’ to a greater 
extent (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Reed & Aquino, 2003; Youniss & 
Yates, 1999). Consequently, the circle of moral regard expansion reduces Moral 
Disengagement, because the others are humanized inside the circle (Aquino et al., 2007; Reed 
& Aquino, 2003). Humanization prevents dehumanization which is one Moral Disengagement 
mechanism (Aquino et al., 2007; Bandura et al., 1996; Bandura et al., 1975). Additionally, 
humanization should affect different Moral Disengagement mechanisms at the same time 
because moral justification, advantageous comparison and others are less necessary when an 
enemy is humanized, i.e. considered inside the circle of moral regard. This explanation was 
derived from theoretical considerations by Aquino et al. (2007) and by Reed and Aquino 
(2003). It was proved in different experimental studies by Reed and Aquino (2003).  
The question that arises is why Moral Identity activation had no direct effect on immoral 
behaviour in the first study by Aquino et al. (2007) even though theoretical considerations 
expected this (Aquino et al., 2007; Lapsley & Lasky, 2001). Aquino et al. (2009) explain this 
missing link with the limited strength of the priming procedure through trait-related 
adjectives. Apparently, Moral Identity activation is strong enough to counter Moral 
Disengagement but not to reduce immoral behaviour directly. 
In the last paragraphs, it was explained theoretically how Moral Identity can be activated and 
how Moral Identity activation interacts with Moral Disengagement. Empirical evidence 
suggests that Moral Identity activation in interaction with Moral Disengagement reduces 
immoral behaviour (Aquino et al., 2009; Aquino et al., 2007). It was explained that this effect 
is probably based on the expansion of the circle of moral regard and humanization of enemies. 
This interactive effect is proposed for this present study, too. Differently from the 
abovementioned studies (Aquino et al., 2009; Aquino et al., 2007) Moral Identity activation is 
not expected to interact with Moral Disengagement measured by a questionnaire but to 
interact with the Permissive Scenario. 
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2.3.3 MORAL IDENTITY ACTIVATION IN INTERACTION WITH MORAL DISENGAGEMENT IN 
MEDIA 
Moral Identity activation is hypothesized to interact with arguments based on Moral 
Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria in media (Permissive Scenario) 
reducing support of war. Two mechanisms are assumed to support this hypothesis.  
The first mechanism behind this interaction effect is the circle of moral regard expansion 
(Aquino et al., 2007; Reed & Aquino, 2003; Singer, 1981; Staub, 1992; Youniss & Yates, 
1999). People whose Moral Identity is activated expand their circle of moral regard (Aquino 
et al., 2007). Supposedly, when they are confronted with the Permissive Scenario, then this 
circle of moral regard expansion ensures that possible victims of a military intervention and 
enemies are included inside this circle. Due to the humanization of others, arguments based 
on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria are less persuasive and 
do not trigger personal Moral Disengagement (Aquino et al., 2007; Bandura et al., 1996; 
Bandura et al., 1975; Reed & Aquino, 2003). 
A second possible explanation for this interaction effect derives from observational learning 
and socialization. Reinforcement of behaviour increases the likelihood that this behaviour 
occurs again (Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2009). During socialization moral standards are 
internalized due to reinforcement by the environment (e.g. parents, peers) and observational 
learning (Bandura, 1999; Bandura & McDonald, 1963). Moral Identity is of certain centrality 
for the self, depending on the frequency and intensity of reinforcement and learning of 
knowledge structures comprising moral traits and standards (Aquino et al., 2009). If a 
person’s Moral Identity is central for this self or if Moral Identity is activated, internalized 
moral standards and moral behaviour are accessible more easily (see subsection 2.3.1; Aquino 
et al., 2009). At the same time the person should be more sensitive and attentive to arguments 
that justify war because he or she has learned that war is immoral. It was described in 
subsection 2.3.1 that the depiction of justified violence in media has a reinforcing effect for a 
person’s own immoral behaviour (Meyer, 1972). The same effect is predicted for the 
Permissive Scenario. This reinforcing effect of arguments based on Moral Disengagement 
mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria (Permissive Scenario) should be diminished 
when a person’s Moral Identity is activated. As a consequence war is less likely to be 
supported.  
Nevertheless, the abovementioned additional assumption has to be taken into account, since it 
is not clear how Moral Identity is constituted in particular with regard to war. Is war 
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considered as something moral or immoral by a person? Aquino and Reed (2002) assume that 
central traits and internalized moral standards of Moral Identity are the same for every person 
(Blasi, 1984). This is questionable, because Moral Identity relies on internalized moral 
standards and traits formed by socialization. Differences in socialization however are not 
reflected in the study samples of Aquino and Reed (2002), Reed and Aquino (2003), Aquino 
et al. (2007) and Aquino et al. (2009). Aquino and Reed (2002) were using a homogenous 
study sample which consisted only of US university students to find out trait-related 
adjectives that could function as situational cues for the activation of Moral Identity. US 
students belong to a variety of different ethnical backgrounds, but roughly they share a 
common US American socialization. Accordingly, it is important to include the additional 
assumption in the analysis.  
In the following section, theoretical considerations and empirical evidence will be 
summarized and transformed into general hypotheses as well as operationalized hypotheses. 
2.4  HYPOTHESES 
People can disengage from their internalized moral standards and self-regulation in order to 
perform immoral behaviour by using different Moral Disengagement mechanisms (Bandura, 
1999). These mechanisms cognitively reconstruct a situation so that immoral behaviour 
appears moral. Mechanisms include moral justification, advantageous comparison, 
euphemistic wording, diffusion and displacement of responsibility and dehumanization 
(Bandura, 1999). Empirical support comes from different studies in which Moral 
Disengagement was measured by a questionnaire (Aquino et al., 2007; Bandura, 1999, 2002; 
Bandura et al., 1996; Cohrs, 2008; Detert et al., 2008; Jackson, 2005b; Grussendorf et al., 
2002; McAlister, 2001; McAlister et al., 2006).  
Hypothesis 1: Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) correlates positively with support of 
immoral behaviour. 
Two central questions are interesting for this research: first, why people support war? Second, 
which factors could possibly diminish this support? Moral Disengagement seems to be a 
valuable concept to answer the first question. McAlister et al. (2006) were able to show in a 
large-sampled study that Moral Disengagement does not only apply to one’s own immoral 
behaviour, but also to the support of war. This finding is supported by Aquino et al. (2007), 
too. For Moral Disengagement to happen in the domain of war it is theoretically necessary 
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that war is actually judged immoral by a person. Therefore, an additional assumption will be 
included in each of the following operationalized hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1a: Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) correlates positively with support of 
war, on the premise that war is considered immoral.  
Media influence personal opinions and behaviour with the help of arguments based on Moral 
Disengagement mechanisms (Bandura, 2002). Media influence on aggressive behaviour 
through Moral Disengagement mechanisms and its reinforcing effect were demonstrated in 
studies by Meyer (1972), by Berkowitz (1984) and by Berkowitz and Rawlings (1963). 
Hypothesis 2: Moral Disengagement within media correlates positively with support of 
immoral behaviour. 
It is further hypothesized that Moral Disengagement within media correlates positively with 
Moral Disengagement as measured by questionnaire. The reason for this is that personal 
Moral Disengagement mechanisms are triggered by the media (Meyer, 1972) so that the 
recipient scores higher in a Moral Disengagement questionnaire. 
Hypothesis 3: Moral Disengagement within media correlates positively with Moral 
Disengagement (questionnaire). 
Parallels between Moral Disengagement and Theory of Just War have been explained for the 
context of war. These parallels suggest that Moral Disengagement mechanisms are used in 
media covering war topics. If this is true, this should affect the audience’s support for 
immoral behaviour (support of war; Cohrs, 2008) and Moral Disengagement as measured by 
questionnaire.  
For this study newspaper articles about a fictive war will be varied with regard to their 
permissiveness. In a Permissive Scenario all arguments based on Moral Disengagement 
mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria are included. Thus, the Permissive Scenario 
works as a positive reinforcement for support of war and triggers personal Moral 
Disengagement. In the Prohibitive Scenario only two arguments based on Moral 
Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria are included. Accordingly, the 
reinforcing effect should be reduced and personal Moral Disengagement should not be 
triggered to the same extent. However, for Moral Disengagement to happen in the domain of 
war it is theoretically necessary that war is actually judged immoral by a person, too. 
Therefore, the additional assumption will be included in the operationalized hypothesis, too. 
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Hypothesis 2a: a Permissive Scenario correlates positively with support of war, on the 
premise that war is considered immoral. 
Hypothesis 3a: a Permissive Scenario correlates positively with Moral Disengagement 
(questionnaire), on the premise that war is considered immoral. 
The second central question for this study is about factors that could possibly diminish 
immoral behaviour and support of war. Moral Identity and its activation can function as an 
instrument to counter arguments of Moral Disengagement. If Moral Identity is activated, 
knowledge structures which comprise internalized moral standards, traits, goals and 
behavioural scripts are cognitively better accessible (Aquino et al., 2009). As a result, circle 
of moral regard is more likely to be expanded and people take into account the suffering of 
those officially labelled ‘enemies’ to a greater extent (Aquino et al., 2007). The circle of 
moral regard expansion reduces Moral Disengagement, because the ‘others’ are humanized 
inside the circle (Aquino et al., 2007; Reed & Aquino, 2003). As a result immoral behaviour 
is reduced likewise. 
Hypothesis 4: Moral Identity activation has a negative effect on Moral Disengagement 
(questionnaire) 
Hypothesis 5+6: Moral Identity activation interacts with Moral Disengagement in media so 
that respondent’s support for immoral behaviour is reduced as well as Moral Disengagement 
(questionnaire). 
In the context of war, Moral Identity activation should work similarly. In this study arguments 
in the Permissive Scenario are based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of 
Just War criteria. Further, the reinforcing effect of arguments based on Moral Disengagement 
mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria (Permissive Scenario) on participants’ support of 
war should be diminished when a person’s Moral Identity is activated. However, for Moral 
Disengagement to function in the domain of war, it is theoretically necessary that war is 
actually judged immoral by a person. Therefore, the additional assumption will be included in 
the operationalized hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 4a: Moral Identity activation has a negative effect on Moral Disengagement 
(questionnaire), on the premise that war is considered immoral. 
Hypotheses 5a + 6a: on the premise that war is considered immoral, Moral Identity activation 
interacts with the degree of permissiveness of the war scenario; so that the difference in 
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support of war and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) between Permissive and 
Prohibitive Scenarios is smaller, when Moral Identity is activated. 
Against theoretical considerations, Moral Identity activation has no direct effect on immoral 
behaviour in studies by Aquino et al. (2007) and Aquino et al. (2009). Apparently the priming 
procedure to activate Moral Identity is not strong enough to affect immoral behaviour 
directly.  
Hypothesis 7: Moral Identity activation has no effect on the support of immoral behaviour. 
Hypothesis 7a: Moral Identity activation has no effect on support of war, on the premise that 
war is considered immoral. 
2.5  REASONS FOR THIS STUDY 
This study builds on the empirically well-established concept of Moral Disengagement which 
allows people to conduct immoral behaviour by cognitively reconstructing reality (Bandura 
1991, 1999). Some studies suggest that Moral Disengagement mechanisms within media 
increase immoral behaviour (Berkowitz, 1984; Berkowitz & Rawlings, 1963; Meyer, 1972) 
and support of war (Cohrs, 2008). This study wants to test if the permissiveness of a fictive 
war scenario written in news style increases support of war. Permissiveness is thereby 
operationalized through the number of arguments based on Moral Disengagement 
mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria. This is interesting because Theory of Just War 
criteria found entrance into international law, but have not been studied in a psychological 
experiment, yet.  
A study by Aquino et al. (2007) supports the idea that Moral Identity activation interacts with 
Moral Disengagement mechanisms reducing war-related immoral behaviour. This present 
study wants to test if this interaction effect can be probed for arguments related to Moral 
Disengagement mechanisms and Just War Theory criteria in media, too.  
The hypotheses base on the assumption that people’s internalized moral standards consider 
war and military interventions as harmful, in other words as immoral behaviour. This is 
important since Moral Identity and Moral Disengagement are based on internalized moral 
standards. This additional assumption will be taken into account statistically for the first time. 
To sum up, this study wants to give empirical evidence for the concept of Moral Identity 
activation and the effects of Moral Disengagement mechanisms within media with regard to 
support of war. Two central questions should be answered by the end of this study. First, is 
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Moral Disengagement decisive for people to support war? Second, is Moral Identity 
activation a factor that could diminish Moral Disengagement and thus support of war? 
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3 METHODS 
This chapter will describe the design and the sample of the study (3.1), procedures (3.2) and 
statistical analysis (3.3) in three different sections. 
3.1  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN  
This study employed a 2 x 2 RO between-subjects factorial design. Factor 1 varied the 
activation of Moral Identity (Independent Variable 1, Moral Identity activation versus control 
group) and factor 2 varied the permissiveness of a fictive war scenario in a newspaper article 
(Independent Variable 2, Permissive Scenario versus Prohibitive Scenario). Permissiveness 
refers to the number of arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of 
Just War criteria. The trait variable was called Moral Consideration of War and reflects 
participants’ internalized moral standards with regard to war. It was used to operationalize the 
additional assumption. 
Design was implemented in online-based soSci Survey (Leiner, 2013). Problems that typically 
arise with online surveys are high drop-out rates and double access (Birnbaum, 2004). 
Whereas high drop-out rates can only be reduced by an interesting topic and post survey 
clarification, double access is usually addressed with IP-address configuration. The online 
platform thereby saves IP-addresses and prohibits the same IP-address from second access to 
the survey. Saving of IP-addresses reduces anonymity and was thus omitted. Instead it is 
argued that motivation for multiple access in order to manipulate results should be relatively 
low. Additionally, the possibility for a second start gives the potential participant an extra 
opportunity to fill out the survey at a later point in time.  
Advantages of online surveys are fast and facile data gathering, few to none transcription 
errors, the possibility of media demonstration and access to other sample populations than just 
psychology students. Due to these advantages and because traditional paper pencil methods 
usually reach the same conclusions as online surveys, the latter was used for this study 
(Birnbaum, 2004).  
Randomization of experimental variables was done with PHP scripts, so that every study 
participant was randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions. Two face to 
face pre-tests and two online pre-tests were performed before the beginning of the study. 
Feedback was integrated into the design. There were no exclusion criteria to participate in this 
study. 
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3.1.1 PARTICIPANTS 
The online survey was accessible from 18.07.2013 till 31.07.2013. In the last days of survey 
access, less and less people participated in the study. This is why access was stopped after two 
weeks. Within this time 292 people accessed the survey including double clicks. In other 
words, potential participants could have accessed the survey twice using the invitation link. 
Figure 1 demonstrates that 118 people from a total of 292 people left the questionnaire on the 
first page. Additional 88 people were leaving after the first and before the survey’s last page. 
In total 86 participants were randomized to the four experimental conditions and completed 
the survey (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Study flow chart 
 
Survey invitations were sent to a Facebook group called “Stipendiatinnen und Stipendiaten 
der Konrad Adenauer Stiftung”, to a mailing list of “Stipendiatinnen und Stipendiaten der 
Heinrich Böll Stiftung” as well as to relatives and friends of the author. The mailing list and 
Facebook group comprise students of two political foundations connected to the Green Party 
and Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Germany. They were chosen in order to gather 
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participants from a wide political spectrum. It is important to have participants from right 
(CDU) to left (Green Party) of the political spectrum because political orientation was shown 
to be influential on the support of war in prior studies (especially Cohrs, 2008; but see also 
Cohrs, Maes, Moschner, & Kielmann, 2007; Cohrs, 2004; Fetchenhauer & Bierhoff, 2004; 
Jackson & Gaertner, 2010; McFarland, 2005). 
Participants spent an average time of 21.5 minutes (SD=7.89) completing the survey, whereby 
minimum time was 7.1 minutes and maximum time was 42.5 minutes. 
3.2  PROCEDURES 
Participants read a description of the questionnaire’s topic, anonymity assurance and an 
experimental instruction (see Annex 7.3) before completing socio-demographic information 
about sex, age, field of studies, political party preferences and political orientation. 
Afterwards, they were first asked to fill out the Military-Pacifism Questionnaire (Cohrs, 2008) 
which comprises a subscale about Moral Consideration of War. Second, Moral Identity 
activation (Independent Variable 1) or control group manipulation took place followed by 
manipulation check and either a Permissive or Prohibitive Scenario (Independent Variable 2). 
After reading the scenario, participants were asked to judge possible remedies and to 
complete the Terrorism Questionnaire as a measure for war-related Moral Disengagement 
(Jackson, 2005). The last part of the survey consisted of the Self-Importance of Moral Identity 
Measure (Reed & Aquino, 2003), the possibility to comment and to leave email address for 
receiving study results. Note that all independent and dependent measures required a response 
from the participant guaranteeing data usability for statistical analysis.  
3.2.1 TRAIT VARIABLES 
This study measured two different trait variables. Moral Consideration of War and Self-
Importance of Moral Identity Scale will be described in the following subsections. 
3.2.1.1 Moral Consideration of War  
Moral Consideration of War reflects internalized moral standards and moral traits concerning 
war. Moral Consideration of War was operationalized by using a subscale of Cohrs’ (2008) 
21-Item Military-Pacifism Questionnaire. The subscale consisted of four different statements 
which were rated on a seven-point Likert scale. Two of the four items were inverted (see 
Table 11 in the annex for German items).  
Of course Moral Consideration of War is not the same as internalized moral standards or 
moral traits with regard to war. However, lacking implicit measures on the particular 
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characteristics and content of internalized moral standards or moral traits with regard to war, 
Moral Consideration of War is a first good approximation.  
However, Moral Consideration of War reflects internalized moral standards concerning war 
not so well, if Moral Disengagement occurs. As mentioned above, Moral Disengagement 
redefines beliefs and cognitively reconstructs reality. It is thus important to measure Moral 
Consideration of War before Moral Disengagement sets in. The complete 21-Item Military-
Pacifism Questionnaire including the subscale Moral Consideration of War was hence 
completed in the beginning of the experiment.  
The Military-Pacifism Questionnaire (Cohrs, 2008) is part of the peace psychological research 
field related to personality characteristics such as authoritarianism, social dominance 
orientation and right-wing extremism (Cohrs, 2004). Besides Moral Consideration of War, the 
questionnaire covers emotional aspects, the perceived inevitability of war and policy 
preferences alike (Cohrs, 2008). Analysis of internal consistency revealed that Cronbach’s 
alpha for all 21 items was 0.94 and for the subscale Moral Consideration of War 0.81. 
Sufficient internal consistency of the subscale allowed the calculation of an average Moral 
Consideration of War score consisting of four items. The order of the items of the Military-
Pacifism Questionnaire was randomized for every participant respectively.  
A high score on the Moral Consideration of War scale implies that war is considered moral. A 
low score implies that war is considered immoral. Therefore, with regard to the theoretical 
considerations, a negative correlation between Moral Consideration of War and Moral 
Disengagement (questionnaire) would be expected. This is because Moral Disengagement is 
necessary only when war is considered immoral. The lower Moral Consideration of War, the 
higher should be Moral Disengagement (questionnaire). 
3.2.1.2 Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale 
In case that Moral Identity activation is not successful, internalization subscale of Self-
Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Reed & Aquino, 2003) was included at the end of the 
experiment (see Table 12 for German items). The scale measures Moral Identity centrality. If 
necessary, the variable can be used as a substitute for Moral Identity activation (Aquino et al., 
2009; Aquino et al., 2007), e.g. by dividing the sample by median split. German translation of 
the measure as well as instruction were taken from Tanner, Ryf & Hanselmann (2009). The 
order of the items of the Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale was randomized for every 
participant respectively. Analysis of internal consistency revealed that Cronbach’s alpha is 
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0.72 for all items of the internalization subscale of Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale 
(Reed & Aquino, 2003). 
3.2.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Two independent variables were used in this study. The following subsections explain Moral 
Identity activation and the Permissive Scenario. 
3.2.2.1 Moral Identity Activation 
Moral Identity activation or control group was manipulated right after the Military-Pacifism 
Questionnaire. Manipulation procedure roughly followed Aquino et al. (2007). Study 
participants in Moral Identity activation group had to think about the following identity-
invoking adjectives: caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, 
honest, and kind. Then participants were asked to write a short story of one or two paragraphs 
about themselves using aforementioned adjectives. Control group underwent the same 
procedure with the following neutral adjectives: carefree, compatible, favourable, happy, 
harmless, open-minded, polite and respectable. Those adjectives are said to be more devoid of 
moral content then the prior mentioned (Aquino, 2007). In difference to Aquino (2007), story 
writing was not done in a handwriting task and there was no cover story. Each participant 
could only be randomized into Moral Identity activation group or control group. 
Both, Moral Identity activation group and control group, had to answer the same four 
questions for manipulation check. Participants should indicate on a seven-point Likert scale (1 
= to some extent to 7 = to a great extent), in how far the written story reflected them as a 
moral person (1), as a student (2), as part of an organization (3) and safety conscious (4). 
Moral Identity activation succeeded, when activated participants indicated that their story 
reflected them significantly more as a moral person than participants in the control group.  
3.2.2.2 Permissive Scenario 
Participants underwent manipulation check and had to read either a Permissive or Prohibitive 
Scenario afterwards. Both scenarios can be found in German in the annex. Fictive scenarios 
were used to prevent that people are influenced by prior formed opinions, further information 
about particular wars and any personal involvement (McAlister et al., 2006; Iyengar, Peters & 
Kinder, 2004). The permissive and prohibitive two-page war scenarios were designed as 
newspaper articles and written in news style. They had two criteria in common: right cause 
and failing diplomatic negotiations (see Table 2). While the Prohibitive Scenario lacked or 
negated further arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just 
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War criteria, the Permissive Scenario comprised and affirmed all the rest of them. The 
differences between the Permissive and Prohibitive Scenario are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Operationalization of Just War Theory Criteria in Permissive and Prohibitive 
Scenario (for exact German wording see scenarios in the annex) 
Theory of Just War 
Criteria (Moral 
Disengagement 
Mechanisms) 
Prohibitive Scenario Permissive Scenario 
1) The war must be based 
on a right cause, e.g. severe 
human rights violations 
happening in a country 
(Moral Justification) 
Systematic and violent 
displacement of an ethnic 
minority in Uwanto. A 
genocide is likely to happen. 
Systematic and violent 
displacement of an ethnic 
minority in Uwanto. A genocide 
is likely to happen. 
2) right intention, meaning 
that the true intention lies in 
the establishment of peace 
or the prevention of severe 
evil (Moral Justification) 
 
Intention of the international 
military intervention in 
Uwanto was in the 
establishment of security 
zones, destroying military 
targets and occupying 
important economic industry 
e.g. oil industry  
Intention of the international 
military intervention in Uwanto 
was in the establishment of 
security zones and destroying 
military targets. 
 
3) proportionality of the 
means employed 
(Advantageous 
Comparison) 
 States see no other than military 
means to resolve the conflict in 
Uwanto 
4) authorized by legitimate 
authority, e.g. the UN 
Security Council 
(Displacement of 
Responsibility) 
Russia vetoed in the UN 
security council against a 
military intervention. 
UN security council legitimated 
the military intervention.  
5) ultima ratio, other non-
military remedies fail 
success (Advantageous 
Comparison) 
Diplomatic negotiations with 
the government in Uwanto 
preceded security council’s 
decision. 
Diplomatic negotiations with the 
government in Uwanto and 
economic sanctions preceded 
security council’s decision. 
(6) probability of success of 
for instance subsequent 
peace agreements 
(Downgrading, Ignoring or 
Misconstruing Negative 
Consequences) 
Military power of Uwanto 
cannot be predicted, because 
the country imports weapons 
since the last 5 years. Plus 
there are few chances for 
peace after the intervention 
because the reconstruction 
and development fund lacks 
financial means. 
Military power of Uwanto is 
considered weak because 
economic sanctions prevented 
the import of military goods in 
the last 5 years. The 
development and reconstruction 
fund has sufficient financing, 
thus, post-intervention peace 
seems more likely. 
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The fictive scenarios told the story of Uwanto, a country in which a genocide against an 
ethnic minority called “Bentale” is likely to happen. The international community is 
concerned and already put diplomatic pressure on the government of Uwanto. However, the 
situation worsened in the last weeks and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
decided whether a military intervention in Uwanto should take place. From here on stories 
vary in their content. This is shown in Table 2. 
Moral Disengagement mechanisms euphemistic wording and dehumanization were not varied 
between the two scenarios. Therefore, the two scenarios were written in neutral manner 
employing no or only weak emotional adjectives. As much as possible, the wording and 
structure of the sentences were kept the same in both scenarios. Two pictures and a fictive 
historical introduction box were included in both texts. One picture showed a map of Uwanto 
and the other depicted a house front covered with bullet holes (copyright by the author of this 
study). At the end of each text, a short comparison of the arguments in favour and against a 
military intervention in Uwanto was made salient in a text box. In this text box pro-military 
intervention arguments outweighed contra ones quantitatively only in the Permissive 
Scenario. Both scenarios were developed and proven on content validity as well as 
consistency in discussions with students from International Relations programme of TU 
Dresden and relatives of the author for several times. Feedback was integrated in the 
conceptualization of the scenarios.  
3.2.3 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
3.2.3.1 Support of War, non-military Remedies and Preference of Remedies 
Possible reactions towards the Permissive and Prohibitive Scenario may be judged differently 
with regard to quality and intensity (Harff, 1987). This is why different remedies were 
available for judgement after reading the scenario (1 = no support to 100= full support):  
a) no remedies to solve the conflict 
b) fact-finding missions and negotiations  
c) economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure 
d) war 
 
The first main outcome measure was support of war in Uwanto (d; scale 1 = no support of 
war till 100 = full support of war) for the regression analyses. The measure preference of 
remedies was included, too. Here participants had to point out which of the abovementioned 
remedies (a-d) they preferred most. Additionally, an optional open text item for explication of 
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the chosen remedy was included. Primary reason for this was to increase participants’ 
motivation to think about their answers more thoroughly and based on the scenario.  
3.2.3.2 Moral Disengagement 
Moral Disengagement was the second main outcome measure. For this, the eight item 
Terrorism Questionnaire by Jackson (2005) was employed. Each item had to be rated on a 
five-point Likert scale. Only the item concerning dehumanization was changed and adapted 
for this study. Analysis of internal consistency revealed that Cronbach’s alpha for all 
Terrorism Questionnaire items was 0.79. Accordingly, for statistical analysis, an average 
Moral Disengagement score of the eight items was calculated. The order of the items of the 
Terrorism Questionnaire was randomized for every participant respectively. 
In the present study, Moral Disengagement is assumed to justify the remedies chosen by each 
study participant. However, it is arguable if that can be measured by questionnaire. The 
Terrorism Questionnaire (Jackson, 2005) can only inadequately reflect people’s inner 
disengagement and justification. Internal processes of mind, such as Moral Disengagement, 
are more complex than an eight item questionnaire. Additionally, it is unsure if the 
questionnaire reflects internal disengagement at all. Perhaps, people start to disengage only 
because they read the questionnaire, or they do so only for specific Moral Disengagement 
mechanisms. Likewise it is possible that no internal disengagement happens at all and 
participants only evaluate the items of the Terrorism Questionnaire (Jackson, 2005). These 
questions will not be answered by this study. They should, however, be kept in mind for the 
interpretation of the results.  
3.3  STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Due to interpretative reasons, dichotomous nominal variables (e.g. experimental conditions) 
were transformed to -1/+1 values so that the amount of change as given by beta weights in 
regression models has to be multiplied by two (from -1 to 0 and from 0 to 1). Variables for 
interaction terms were centred to avoid multicollinearity.  
Normal distribution of metrical variables was assessed with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-
S test) and graphical analysis using Q-Q plots. For mean differences, student T-tests were 
calculated whereby homogeneity of variances was assessed with Levene’s test. In order to 
avoid alpha error accumulation, analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used for multiple 
comparisons. Hypotheses were tested in two different regression models. Correlations were 
calculated with Pearson product moment correlation coefficients (PPMCC). Level of 
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significance was set at α < 0.05. Study sample of N > 80 seems to be sufficient for eight to 
nine predictors when assuming medium to large effects and α < 0.05 (Bortz & Döring, 2002). 
All statistical analyses were done with SPSS 20.  
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4 RESULTS 
The following chapter is divided in three main sections. The first section looks at descriptive 
statistics for socio-demographic data, Moral Consideration of War and dependent variables 
such as support of war and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire). The next section is about 
the manipulation check of Moral Identity activation. The third and last section covers 
inferential statistics testing the hypotheses of this study with two regression models.  
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The descriptive statistics cover socio-demographic data, Moral Consideration of War scale 
and dependent variables such as the support of war and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) 
in different subsections. The goal is to give a broad overview of the study results. 
4.1.1 SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS  
This subsection gives a descriptive overview about gender, age, participants’ field of studies, 
political party preferences and political orientation.  
45 study participants were female and 41 were male. Mean age was 25 years (SD=9.80), with 
a minimum of 19 and a maximum of 76 years. Age was not following normal distribution and 
the distribution is right skewed (K-S test and graphical analysis with Q-Q plot, skewness 
=3.50).  
88 % of the sample were students, 8 % were employed, 3 % were PhD students and 1 % were 
pensioners. 18.4 % of all students studied political sciences, 14.5 % studied engineering and 
about 9 % studied cultural and language studies, law and medicine, respectively. 17 % of the 
students marked category ‘other’ and were not further specified. Categories with less than 9 % 
were Psychology, Mathematics, Physics and Economics. 
Concerning political party preferences, 7% would have vote for Social Democratic Party 
(SPD), 23% would have voted for CDU/CSU, 59% would have voted for Green Party 
(Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), 4% would have voted for the Left Party (DIE LINKE) and 7% 
would have voted for other political parties if the following Sunday (01.08.2013) had been 
Bundestag elections. Figure 2 illustrates that this distribution did not correspond to the 
FORSA election survey at that point of time (Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung und statistische 
Analyse GmbH, 2013).  
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Figure 2: Political preferences of participants compared to German population 
 
Regarding political orientation, average was 35.20 (SD=19.90, 1=leftist, 50=middle, 
100=right-wing) following right skewed normal distribution (K-S test and graphical analysis 
with Q-Q plot).  
4.1.2 MORAL CONSIDERATION OF WAR 
Moral Consideration of War scale was about internalized moral standards and important for 
the additional assumption of the hypotheses. Moral Consideration of War was a subscale of 
Cohrs’ 21-Item Military-Pacifism Questionnaire (2008). Concerning this subscale, four items 
were averaged. Each item was thereby rated on a seven-point Likert scale. Whereby a higher 
value implied that participants agree to a greater extent on items which propose military 
means of conflict resolution as morally acceptable. The mean was 3.37 (SD=1.46) and median 
was 3, following normal distribution (K-S test, skewness=0.54, graphical analysis with Q-Q 
plot). Moral Consideration of War was centred for interaction terms. See Table 11 in the 
annex for means and standard deviations of Moral Consideration of War scale. 
4.1.3 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
This subsection describes participants’ preference of remedies and the support for each 
remedy after reading the Permissive or Prohibitive Scenario. Additionally, Moral 
Disengagement as measured by the Terrorism Questionnaire (Jackson, 2005) is covered, too.  
4.1.3.1 Support of War, Non-Military Remedies and Preference of Remedies 
Preference of remedies was ‘negotiations and observer missions’ for 47 participants, followed 
by ‘economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure’ for 27 participants. 10 participants preferred 
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‘war’ above all others and 2 participants preferred ‘no remedies’ most. Concerning the 
support of each specific remedy (scale from 1 = no support to 100 = high support), highest 
support was observed for ‘negotiations and observer missions’ (M=84.47, SD=22.92), 
followed by ‘economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure’ (M=75.71, SD=30.53). Looking at 
support of ‘war‘, average support was 36.02 (SD = 29.6) following normal distribution (K-S 
test and graphical analysis with Q-Q plot, skewness=0.56). Support of war is one of the main 
outcome measures of this study and will be used as a dependent variable in regression model 
1.  
There were two significant mean differences between experimental groups and the support of 
different remedies. Firstly, Permissive Scenario (M=42.02, SD=31.07) and Prohibitive 
Scenario (M=30.56, SD=27.43) differed significantly concerning the support of war (F (1, 84) 
=3.31, p<0.05, ANOVA see Table 5 in the annex). Secondly, Moral Identity activation 
(M=90.85, SD=17.58) and control group (M=78.64, SD=25.71) differed significantly 
concerning the support of ‘negotiations and observer missions’ (F (1, 84) =6.48, p<0.05, 
ANOVA see Table 6 in the annex). 
The explanations in the open text item suggest that most participants thought about their 
answers thoroughly. Many explained their standpoint in one or two paragraphs with regard to 
the previous read scenario.  
4.1.3.2 Moral Disengagement 
Average score over the eight items the Terrorism Questionnaire was computed (five-point 
Likert scale, Jackson, 2005). Mean was 2.73 (SD = 0.72) following normal distribution (K-S 
test and graphical analysis with Q-Q plot, skewness=0.25). Concerning each Moral 
Disengagement mechanisms, ‘minimizing and ignoring consequences’ had highest acceptance 
with a mean of 3.27 (SD = 1.13), whereas ‘displacement of responsibility’ was least accepted 
with a mean of 2.19 (SD=1.14, see Table 7 in the annex).  
There was one significant mean difference between experimental groups and the support of 
different remedies (see Table 8 and Table 11 in the annex). Moral Identity activation 
(M=3.54, SD=0.98) and control group (M=3.02, SD=1.21) differed significantly concerning 
‘minimizing and ignoring consequences’ (F (1, 84) =4.60, p<0.05, ANOVA see Table 8 in the 
annex).  
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4.2  MANIPULATION CHECK 
The following section explores if Moral Identity activation was successful. This is a 
prerequisite regarding hypothesized effects of Moral Identity activation. Moral Identity 
activation and subsequent manipulation check were done before participants read the 
Permissive or Prohibitive Scenario. 
Moral Identity activation and control group manipulation was realized with the task to write 
down short personal stories using trait-related adjectives. Study participants were then asked 
to indicate how much the story they wrote reflected how they see themselves: (1) as a student, 
(2) as a member of an organization, (3) as a moral person and (4) as safety conscious (on a 
seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = to some extent to 7 = to a great extent). The 
resulting four different scores were used as dependent variables for MANOVA. Moral 
Identity activation was used as independent factor. MANOVA revealed significant differences 
in dependent variables (Pillai-Spur = 0.30, F (4, 81) =306, p=0.00; Pillai-Spur test 
requirements were confirmed with Mauchly's sphericity test).  
Effectiveness of Moral Identity activation was further proven with a single one-way ANOVA 
using these items (1-4) as dependent variables. ANOVA addresses alpha error accumulation 
of multiple testing. The Moral Identity activation condition had a significant effect only on the 
extent to which participants’ stories reflected them as moral people (F (1, 84) = 20.89, 
p<0.01). Participants who underwent Moral Identity activation said that the story reflected 
more about them as a moral person (M=5.83, SD=1.18) than those who were in control group 
(M=4.27, SD=1.88) suggesting that Moral Identity manipulation succeeded in increasing the 
salience of Moral Identity. No significant differences were found for the other items (all F’s 
(1, 85) <1.50, p>0.05), for all mean differences see Table 10 in the annex). 
An average score of Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale was built (Reed & Aquino, 
2003). It was the last scale that participants had to complete in the experiment. Student’s T-
Test for the Moral Identity activation group (M=4.29, SD=0.50) and control group (M=3.92, 
SD=0.76) revealed significant differences in the total Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale 
(T (1, 83) = -2.62, p<0.05). Levene’s test revealed homogeneity of variance (F (1, 83) =3.10, 
p<0.05). This finding suggests that Moral Identity activation succeeded in increasing the 
salience of Moral Identity until the end of the experiment. 
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4.3  HYPOTHESES TESTS 
The goal of this section is to test hypotheses with two different regression models. Hypotheses 
were tested with two different regression models using support of war (model 1) and Moral 
Disengagement (model 2) as dependent variables. First, regression models will be described. 
Second, each hypothesis (1-6) is tested. 
Model 1 is shown in Table 3 and Equation 1. In model 1, support of war was regressed on 
Moral Consideration of War (MCW), Permissive Scenario (PS), Moral Identity activation 
(MIA) as well as three first and one second order interaction terms (see Table 3 and Equation 
1). Moral Consideration of War was centred for interaction terms. Due to interpretative 
reasons, dichotomous experimental conditions were transformed to -1/+1 values. 
Equation 1: Regression Model 1 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑊𝑎𝑟
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐶𝑊 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑆 +  𝛽3 𝑀𝐼𝐴 +  𝛽4𝑀𝐼𝐴 𝑥 𝑀𝐶𝑊 +  𝛽5𝑃𝑆 𝑥 𝑀𝐼𝐴
+  𝛽6𝑃𝑆 𝑥 𝑀𝐶𝑊 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑆 𝑥 𝑀𝐼𝐴 𝑥 𝑀𝐶𝑊 
Table 3: Model 1, Support of War (N=85) 
 Not standardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
T Significance 
 Variables B Standard 
error (SE) 
Beta  p 
Constant term (Support of 
War) 
36.61 2.58  14.21 0.00 
Moral Consideration of 
War (MCW) 
12.22 1.80 0.60 6.80 0.00 
Permissive Scenario (PS) 6.25 2.58 0.21 2.43 0.02 
Moral Identity Activation 
(MIA) 
2.89 2.58 0.10 1.12 0.27 
MIA x MCW  -0.39 1.80 -0.02 -0.21 0.83 
PS x MIA 1.53 2.58 0.05 0.60 0.55 
PS x MCW 0.72 1.80 0.04 0.40 0.69 
PS x MIA x MCW -0.51 1.80 -0.03 -0.28 0.78 
Note: Corrected R² = 0.36, Moral Consideration of War (from 1 = low to 7 = high) was centred for interaction 
terms, Scenario (Permissive Scenario = 1, Prohibitive Scenario= -1), Moral Identity Activation (Yes = 1, No= -1) 
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Model 2 is shown in Table 4 and Equation 2. In model 2, Moral Disengagement was 
regressed on Moral Consideration of War (MCW), support of war, Permissive Scenario (PS), 
Moral Identity activation (MIA) as well as four first and one second order interaction terms 
(see Table 4 and Equation 2). Moral Consideration of War and support of war were centred 
for interaction terms. Due to interpretative reasons, dichotomous experimental conditions 
were transformed to -1/+1 values. 
Equation 2: Regression Model 2 
𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐶𝑊 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑆 +  𝛽3 𝑀𝐼𝐴 +  𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑊𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽5𝑀𝐼𝐴 𝑥 𝑀𝐶𝑊
+  𝛽6𝑃𝑆 𝑥 𝑀𝐼𝐴 +  𝛽7𝑃𝑆 𝑥 𝑀𝐶𝑊 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑊𝑎𝑟 𝑥 𝑀𝐶𝑊
+ 𝛽9𝑃𝑆 𝑥 𝑀𝐼𝐴 𝑥 𝑀𝐶𝑊 
Table 4: Model 2, Moral Disengagement (N=85) 
 Not standardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
T Significance 
Variables B Standard 
error (SE) 
Beta  p 
Constant term (Moral 
Disengagement) 
1.97 0.18  11.00 0.00 
Moral Consideration of War 
(MCW) 
0.23 0.05 0.47 4.44 0.00 
Permissive Scenario (PS) -0.10 0.06 -0.14 -1.62 0.11 
Moral Identity Activation 
(MIA) 
0.10 0.06 0.14 1.67 0.10 
Support of War 0.01 0.00 0.29 2.78 0.01 
PS x MIA -0.05 0.06 -0.06 -0.78 0.44 
MIA x MCW -0.10 0.04 -0.20 -2.40 0.02 
PS x MCW 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.86 0.40 
Support of War x MCW -0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.88 0.38 
PS x MIA x MCW -0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.40 0.70 
Note: Corrected R² = 0.47, Moral Consideration of War scale (1 = low to 7 = high) was centred for interaction 
terms, Scenario (Permissive Scenario = 1, Prohibitive Scenario = -1), Moral Identity Activation (Yes = 1, No = -
1), support of war (from 1 to 100) was centred for interaction term. 
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Of course Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) could have been included in model 1, too. 
However, Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) was measured after support of war. Hence, it 
is more logical to not include this variable in model 1 and test for instance hypothesis 1a in 
model 2 (when controlling for other experimental variables). 
Important premises for regression models such as normal distribution of metrical variables 
have been confirmed. Multicollinearity implies significant inter-correlation of predictor 
variables and is given only for support of war and Moral Consideration of War. 
Heteroscedasticity means heterogeneity of variance and distorts regression analyses. It was 
checked for with graphical analysis, plotting the two dependent measures against their 
residuals. Heteroscedasticity was observed neither for support of war nor for Moral 
Disengagement. Thus, premises for regression analyses seem fulfilled and hypotheses will be 
tested in the following.  
4.3.1 HYPOTHESIS 1A 
It was predicted that Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) correlates positively with support 
of war, on the premise that war is considered immoral. To answer this hypothesis, mean 
Moral Disengagement score as measured by the Terrorism Questionnaire (Jackson, 2005) was 
multiplied with Moral Consideration of War. Both variables were centred before 
multiplication. The resulting interaction term correlated positively with support of war 
(r=0.23, p=0.04, PPMCC). When controlling for experimental variables interaction term of 
support of war and Moral Consideration of War was not significant in model 2 (B < 0.01, 
SE<0.01, T (75) = -0.88, p=0.38, see Table 4). Note that a high score on the Moral 
Consideration of War subscale implies that war is considered moral. A low score implies that 
war is considered immoral. Due to this codification, correlation would have been expected to 
be negative. Hypothesis 1a is thus rejected.  
This finding will be further looked at: for demonstrative reasons, sample was divided by 
median split of Moral Consideration of War scale. Correlation of Moral Disengagement and 
support of war for participants scoring above 3 on Moral Consideration of War scale (war is 
considered moral), was positive and significant (r=0.58, p<0.01, PPMCC). For participants 
scoring below 3 (war is considered immoral), this correlation was positive and significant, too 
(r=0.53, p<0.01, PPMCC). Next, cut-off point of moral consideration of war was set up to 5 
including only participants who agreed to a great extent to statements on the morality of war 
(n=14). The resulting correlation of Moral Disengagement and support of war was still 
positive but not significant anymore (r=0.36, p=0.20, PPMCC). However, the theoretical 
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considerations would expect the correlation (Moral Disengagement x support of war) to be 
negative especially for the case that participants scored below 3 for Moral Consideration of 
War. Because the lower Moral Consideration of War, the more disengagement from 
internalized moral standards would be necessary. On the other hand, Moral Consideration of 
War and Moral Disengagement correlated positively (r=0.67, p<0.01, PPMCC). However, a 
negative correlation between Moral Consideration of War and Moral Disengagement 
(questionnaire) would be expected. This is because Moral Disengagement is necessary only 
when war is considered immoral by internalized moral standards. The lower Moral 
Consideration of War, the higher should be Moral Disengagement (questionnaire).  
Due to the findings in the abovementioned paragraph, it is possible that the additional 
assumption, i.e. internalized moral standards, was not operationalized well by using the Moral 
Consideration of War scale. Hence, for this hypothesis 1a as well as for all the following 
hypotheses, main effects or first order interaction effects disregarding the additional 
assumption will be reported, too. Note that these effects were not predicted by the hypotheses.  
Disregarding the additional assumption, correlation of support of war and Moral 
Disengagement (questionnaire) was positive (r=0.58, p<0.01, PPMCC). Relationship between 
the two variables was significant and positive when controlled for other experimental 
variables in model 2 (B<0.01, SE<0.01, T (75) = 2.78, p=0.01, see Table 4).  
4.3.2 HYPOTHESES 2A + 3A 
It was predicted that a Permissive Scenario correlates positively with the support of war 
(hypothesis 2a) and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire, hypothesis 3a), on the premise that 
war is considered immoral. Regarding hypothesis 2a, interaction of Permissive Scenario and 
Moral Consideration of War had no significant effect on support of war in model 1 (B=0.72, 
SE=1.80, T(76)=0.40, p=0.69, see Table 3). Thus, hypothesis 2a is rejected. Concerning 
hypothesis 3a, interaction of Permissive Scenario and Moral Consideration of War had no 
significant effect on Moral Disengagement in model 2 (B=0.04, SE=0.04, T (75) = 0.86, 
p=0.40, see Table 4). Consequently, hypothesis 5a is also disproved.  
In order to estimate the relationship between Permissive Scenario on support of war and 
Moral Disengagement without the additional assumption (Moral Consideration of War), main 
effects of Permissive Scenario are reported. The Permissive Scenario had on the one hand a 
significant positive effect on support of war, when controlled for other experimental variables 
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in regression analysis (B=6.23, SE=2.58, T (76) = 2.43, p=0.02, see Table 3). This main effect 
is visualized in Figure 3.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Support of war as a function of Permissive Scenario and Moral Identity Activation. 
The Figure illustrates significant main effect of Permissive Scenario on support of 
war and not significant interaction of Moral Identity activation and Permissive 
Scenario on support of war. 
 
On the other hand, the Permissive Scenario had a not significant effect on Moral 
Disengagement when controlled for the other experimental variables (B= -0.10, SE=0.06, T 
(75) = -1.62, p=0.11, see Table 4).  
4.3.3 HYPOTHESIS 4A 
It was predicted that Moral Identity activation has a negative effect on Moral Disengagement 
(questionnaire), on the premise that war is considered immoral. With regard to this 
hypothesis, interaction of Moral Identity activation and Moral Consideration of War had a 
significant effect on Moral Disengagement (B= -0.10, SE=0.04, T (75) = -2.40, p=0.02, see 
Table 4 and Figure 4). That is to say, the gradient of the slope decreased in regression model 2 
when Moral Identity was activated. Note that high numbers of Moral Consideration of War 
reflect participants’ opinion that war is moral, in other words that military means of conflict 
resolution are morally acceptable. Therefore, hypothesis 4a is rejected. 
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This finding will be further explained with regard to Figure 4: for demonstrative reasons, 
sample was divided by median split (median = 3), representing two equally sized groups that 
either judge war as something immoral (n=44) or moral (n=42). It was already described for 
hypothesis 1a that relationship for Moral Disengagement and Moral Consideration of War 
was expected to be negative. This is because Moral Disengagement is necessary only when 
war is considered immoral, i.e. Moral Consideration of War is low. Figure 4 illustrates that 
the relationship between Moral Consideration of War and Moral Disengagement is positive. 
 
Figure 4: Moral Disengagement as a function of Moral Consideration of War (MCW, median 
split) and Moral Identity activation. Scores below median imply that war is 
considered immoral, whereas scores above median imply that war is considered 
moral. 
 
Further, Figure 4 illustrates that Moral Identity activation increases Moral Disengagement 
scores from 2.01 (SD=0.49) to 2.64 (SD=0.56) for participants who judge war as something 
immoral (Moral Consideration of War below median, left side of X-axis, n=44). This is 
contrary to hypothesis 4a which predicted that Moral Identity activation reduces Moral 
Disengagement (questionnaire), on the premise that war is considered immoral.  
In order to estimate the relationship between Moral Identity activation on Moral 
Disengagement without the additional assumption (Moral Consideration of War), main effect 
of Moral Identity activation is reported. Moral Identity activation had a positive but not 
significant effect on Moral Disengagement (B=0.10, SE=0.06, T (75) =1.68, p=0.10, see 
Table 4). 
2.64 
3.14 
2.01 
3.23 
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
MCW Below Median MCW Above Median
M
o
ra
l 
D
is
en
g
ag
em
en
t 
Moral Identity Activation Control Group
  
53 
4.3.4 HYPOTHESES 5A + 6A 
It was predicted that Moral Identity activation interacts with the degree of permissiveness of 
the war scenario, on the premise that war is considered immoral. In particular the difference in 
support of war (hypothesis 5a) and Moral Disengagement (hypothesis 6a) between Permissive 
and Prohibitive Scenario is smaller when Moral Identity is activated. 
Regarding hypothesis 5a, second order interaction term of Moral Identity activation, 
Permissive Scenario and Moral Consideration of War had a not significant effect on the 
support of war (B= -0.51, SE=1.8, T (76) = -0.28, p=0.78, see Table 3, Figure 5 and Figure 6). 
Thus, hypothesis 5a is disproved. 
 
Figure 5: Support of war as a function of Permissive Scenario and Moral Identity activation 
for all participants who have a Moral Consideration of War above median 
suggesting that they judge war as moral. 
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Figure 6: Support of war as a function of Permissive Scenario and Moral Identity activation 
for all participants who have a Moral Consideration of War below median 
suggesting that they judge war as immoral. 
 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the not significant first order interaction effects of Moral Identity 
activation and Permissive Scenario on support of war, respectively for Moral Consideration 
above median (Figure 5) and below (Figure 6).  
Second order interaction term of Moral Identity activation, Permissive Scenario and Moral 
Consideration of War had a not significant effect on Moral Disengagement (B= -0.02, 
SE=0.04, T (75) = -0.40, p=0.70, see Table 4, Figure 7 and Figure 8). As a result, hypothesis 
6a is also rejected.  
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Figure 7: Moral Disengagement as a function of Permissive Scenario and Moral Identity 
activation for all participants who have a Moral Consideration of War above median 
suggesting that they judge war as something moral. 
 
Figure 8: Moral Disengagement as a function of Permissive Scenario and Moral Identity 
activation for all participants who have a Moral Consideration of War below median 
suggesting that they judge war as something immoral. 
 
Figure 7 and Figure 8 depict the not significant first order interaction effects on Moral 
Disengagement of Moral Identity activation and Permissive Scenario, respectively for Moral 
Consideration of War above median (Moral Consideration of War > 3, Figure 7) and below 
(Moral Consideration of War < 3, Figure 8).  
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In order to estimate the relationship between Moral Identity activation in interaction with 
Permissive Scenario without the additional assumption, first order interaction without Moral 
Consideration of War will be reported. First order interaction of Moral Identity activation and 
Permissive Scenario had a not significant effect on the support of war (B=1.54, SE=2.58, T 
(76) =0.60, p=0.55, see Table 3 and Figure 3). Further, first order interaction of Moral 
Identity activation and Permissive Scenario had a not significant effect on Moral 
Disengagement (B= -0.05, SE=0.06, T (75) = -0.78, p=0.44, see Table 4). 
4.3.5 HYPOTHESIS 7A 
Moral Identity activation was expected to have no effect on support of war, on the premise 
that war is considered immoral. Regarding this hypothesis, interaction of Moral Identity 
activation and Moral Consideration of War had no significant effect on support of war in 
model 1 (B= -0.39, SE=1.80, T (76) = -0.21, p=0.83, see Table 3). Thus, hypothesis 7a is 
affirmed. 
In order to estimate the relationship between Moral Identity activation and the support of war 
without the additional assumption, main effect will be reported. Moral Identity activation had 
no significant effect on support of war (B=2.89, SE=2.58, T (76) = 1.10, p=0.27, see Table 3).  
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5 DISCUSSION 
This study seeks to answer two key questions. Firstly, is Moral Disengagement decisive for 
people to support war? Secondly, is Moral Identity activation a factor that could diminish 
Moral Disengagement and thus support of war? The rationale for the first question was 
derived from the Socio Cognitive Theory of Morality (Bandura, 1999) and from the Social-
Cognitive Model of Moral Behaviour (Aquino et al., 2009) for the second one. Seven 
hypotheses were deducted from these theories to find answers to the two questions. A 2 x 2 
RO between-subjects factorial design was employed to test the hypotheses. Factor 1 varied 
the activation of Moral Identity (Moral Identity activation versus control group) and factor 2 
varied how permissive the war scenario was depicted with regard to Moral Disengagement 
mechanisms (Permissive Scenario versus Prohibitive Scenario). An additional assumption 
took into account in how far participants’ internalized moral standards consider war as 
immoral. This was done with a Moral Consideration of War scale. 
All but one hypothesis of this study were rejected: regarding hypothesis 1a, there was a 
positive correlation between the interaction term support of war and Moral Consideration of 
War on the one hand and Moral Disengagement on the other. However, the correlation should 
have been negative due to the codification of Moral Consideration of War. Hypotheses 2a and 
3a were rejected, since the Permissive Scenario in interaction with Moral Consideration of 
War failed to increase support of war and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire). Hypothesis 
4a was also disproved, Moral Identity activation in interaction with Moral Consideration of 
War had a negative effect on Moral Disengagement. Due to the codification of Moral 
Consideration of War the correlation should have been positive. Considering hypotheses 5a 
and 6a it was found that the second order interaction terms of Moral Identity activation, 
Permissive Scenario and Moral Consideration of War had no significant effect neither on 
support of war nor on Moral Disengagement. Only hypothesis 7a was affirmed. As expected, 
Moral Identity activation in interaction with Moral Consideration of War had no significant 
effect on support of war.  
The results will be discussed more deeply in the following two sections (5.1 and 5.2). It is 
proposed that there were methodological problems with regard to the additional assumption, 
i.e. measurement of internalized moral standards by Moral Consideration of War scale. These 
problems will be discussed in section 5.3. Section 5.4 looks at simple main effects 
disregarding the additional assumption, in other words Moral Consideration of War. Section 
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5.5 is about limitations to this study with regard to the sample and methodology. A final 
conclusion will be provided in section 5.6. 
5.1  MORAL DISENGAGEMENT AND SUPPORT OF WAR 
People can disengage from their internalized moral standards and self-regulation in order to 
perform immoral behaviour by using different Moral Disengagement mechanisms (Bandura, 
1999). Mechanisms include ‘moral justification’, ‘advantageous comparison’, ‘euphemistic 
wording’, ‘diffusion and displacement of responsibility’ and ‘dehumanization’ (Bandura, 
1999). McAlister et al. (2006) were able to show that Moral Disengagement mechanisms do 
not only apply to a person’s immoral behaviour, but also to the support of war. It was 
therefore hypothesized (Hypothesis 1a) that Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) correlates 
positively with support of war, on the premise that war is considered immoral. This additional 
assumption was included, because for Moral Disengagement to happen in the domain of war 
it is theoretically necessary that war is actually judged immoral by a person. This additional 
assumption was operationalized by the Moral Consideration of War scale and was included in 
each of the hypotheses. A high score on the scale means that war is considered moral and a 
low score that war is considered immoral.  
For hypothesis 1a, a significant correlation between interaction term of Moral Disengagement 
and Moral Consideration of War on the one hand and support of war on the other was found 
(r=0.23, p=0.04, PPMCC).
2
 Hypothesis 1a was still rejected because correlation should have 
been negative. To explain this, the sample was divided into two groups by a median split with 
regard to the Moral Consideration of War scale (first group = low score = war is considered 
immoral, second group = high score = war is considered moral). The correlations between the 
support of war and Moral Disengagement were positive and roughly equal for both groups. 
However, the theoretical considerations would expect the correlation to be negative especially 
for the first group. This is because Moral Disengagement is necessary to a greater extent if 
war is considered immoral, i.e. the lower the Moral Consideration of War score. This finding 
puts doubts on whether the Moral Consideration of War scale really measured internalized 
moral standards. There are methodological problems with this scale which will be addressed 
                                                 
2
 It would have been possible to transform the codification of the Moral Consideration of War scale. So that a 
high score means that war is considered immoral and a low score the opposite. Then, the hypotheses should have 
been changed, too. For instance for hypothesis 1a: Moral Disengagement within media correlates negatively 
with support of war, on the premise that war is considered moral. It was refrained from this because it seemed 
counter intuitive to the author. 
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in section 5.3. Possibly, due to these problems most of the other hypotheses were disproved, 
too.  
Media influence personal opinions and behaviour with the help of arguments based on Moral 
Disengagement mechanisms (Bandura, 2002). For this study newspaper articles about a 
fictive war scenario were varied with regard to their permissiveness. In a Permissive Scenario 
all arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria are 
included. In the Prohibitive Scenario only two arguments based on Moral Disengagement 
mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria were included. Parallels between Moral 
Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria have been explained. Hypothesis 
2a and 3a accordingly predicted that a Permissive Scenario correlates positively with support 
of war and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire), on the premise that war is considered 
immoral. Results from regression models 1 and 2 indicate that hypotheses 2a and 3a are 
rejected. It could be interpreted that positive reinforcement of arguments that justify war in 
the Permissive Scenario did not work to increase support of war as expected (cf. Bandura et 
al., 1975; Berkowitz, 1984; Berkowitz and Rawlings, 1963; Meyer, 1972). Further, personal 
Moral Disengagement perhaps had not been triggered by the arguments given in the 
Permissive Scenario (Cohrs, 2008). However, it seems more likely that the additional 
assumption was operationalized inadequately (see section 5.3). Accordingly, the question 
whether Moral Disengagement increases a person’s support of war cannot be answered finally 
at this point.  
5.2  MORAL IDENTITY AND SUPPORT OF WAR 
Moral Identity and its activation can function as an instrument to counter arguments of Moral 
Disengagement and thus diminish support of war. Manipulation check suggested that Moral 
Identity activation succeeded in increasing the salience of Moral Identity within the 
participants. Therefore, it was first tested if Moral Identity activation had a negative effect on 
Moral Disengagement (questionnaire), on the premise that war was considered immoral 
(hypothesis 4a). The interaction of Moral Identity activation and Moral Consideration of War 
had a significant effect on Moral Disengagement (B= -0.10, SE=0.04, T (75) = -2.40, p=0.02, 
see Table 4 and Figure 4). With regard to the direction of the effect, hypothesis 4a was 
rejected. To explain this, the sample was divided into two groups by a median split with 
regard to the Moral Consideration of War scale (first group = low score = war is considered 
immoral, second group = high score = war is considered moral). Contrary to the prediction, 
Moral Identity activation increased Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) from 2.01 
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(SD=0.49) to 2.64 (SD=0.56) when looking at participants who consider war as immoral (see 
also Figure 4). Most likely this is because of methodological problems with regard to the 
additional assumption (see section 5.3). 
Hypothesis 5a + 6a tested the interaction effect of the two experimental variables on support 
of war and Moral Disengagement. On the premise that war was considered immoral, Moral 
Identity activation was proposed to interact with the degree of permissiveness of the war 
scenario. In particular the difference in the support of war and Moral Disengagement 
(questionnaire) between Permissive Scenario and Prohibitive Scenario was supposed to be 
smaller, when Moral Identity was activated. Results indicate that hypotheses 5a + 6a had to be 
rejected because there was no significant effect. These results could lead to the interpretation 
that Moral Identity activation did not make knowledge structures which comprise internalized 
moral standards, traits, goals and behavioural scripts cognitively better accessible (Aquino et 
al., 2009). Further, circle of moral regard was not expanded and ‘others’ were not humanized 
and instead excluded from inside the circle (Aquino et al., 2007; Reed & Aquino, 2003). At 
the end Moral Disengagement mechanisms would not have been prevented because 
humanization failed.  
Hypothesis 7a is the only hypothesis that was affirmed. Moral Identity activation had no 
effect on support of war, on the premise that war is considered immoral. This result can be 
found in the studies by Aquino et al. (2007) and Aquino et al. (2009), too. 
However, conclusions on a functional level and with regard to the second central question 
would be too rash, since the additional assumption was included in hypotheses 4a, 5a, 6a and 
7a, respectively. It was already mentioned that methodological problems with the 
measurement of Moral Consideration of War occurred. These will be discussed in the 
following section. 
5.3  METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 
In this section conceptual parallels between Moral Consideration of War items (Cohrs, 2008) 
and items of Moral Disengagement (Jackson, 2005; Terrorism Questionnaire) will be 
analysed. High positive correlations between the items will be used to support the 
considerations. 
Certain methodological inconsistencies appear when looking into items that were supposed to 
measure Moral Consideration of War. Moral Consideration of War was supposed to measure 
internalized moral standards and moral traits concerning war. Moral Consideration of War 
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was a subscale of Cohrs’ (2008) 21-item Military-Pacifism Questionnaire. Reviewing 3 of the 
4 Moral Consideration of War items (see Table 11 in the annex for German items), it appears 
that they are similar to Moral Disengagement items (see Table 7 in the annex for German 
items). More specifically they are related to ‘moral justification’ mechanism, for instance: 
War can be ethically justified when fighting terrorism (1) or War can be ethically justified 
when fighting for peace and human rights (2) or Use of military force violates the rules of 
civil life (3, inverted) as compared to It is irresponsible to renounce the use of military force if 
a contribution to world-peace can be made by it (Item 1; Jackson, 2005; Terrorism 
Questionnaire). These three explicit items are conceptually related to Moral Disengagement 
because they comprise a disengagement or reason for accepting that war is moral. The 
remaining item says War is morally condemnable as a matter of principle (4, inverted). It is 
not sure if it implies autonomous disengagement or not. Because if someone accepts this 
moral statement in favour of war, then he or she perhaps thinks about why accepting it. This 
search for reasons for war represents already one mechanism of Moral Disengagement 
(‘moral justification’). And even if someone accepts this statement because it simply reflects 
his or her internalized moral standard, the Moral Disengagement for those standards could 
have happened before.  
It was argued that Moral Disengagement cannot be ruled out while measuring internalized 
moral standards, i.e. Moral Consideration on War (Cohrs, 2008; Military-Pacifism 
Questionnaire). Moral Consideration of War was measured in the beginning of the study. It is 
known from other studies that Moral Disengagement prior to the immoral behaviour 
correlates positively with the immoral behaviour (Aquino et al., 2007; Bandura, 1999; 
McAlister et al., 2006). In the case of this study the measurement of Moral Consideration of 
War which included Moral Disengagement already, increased support of war. Therefore, 
Moral Consideration of War scale explains much of the variance in the two regression 
models. The relationship between the Moral Consideration of War scale and Moral 
Disengagement (questionnaire) was also significant and positive when controlled for other 
experimental variables in model 2 (B = 0.23, SE=0.05, T (75) = 4.44, p<0.01, see Table 4). 
Further, the simple correlation between Moral Consideration of War scale and Moral 
Disengagement (questionnaire) is relatively high (r=0.58, p<0.01, PPMCC), too. However, a 
negative correlation between Moral Consideration of War (low score = war is considered 
immoral, high score = war is considered moral) and Moral Disengagement (questionnaire) 
was expected. This is because Moral Disengagement is necessary to a greater extent, the 
lower the Moral Consideration of War score, i.e. when war is considered immoral. 
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In conclusion, the conceptual parallels between Moral Consideration of War items (Cohrs, 
2008) and items of Moral Disengagement (Jackson, 2005; Terrorism Questionnaire) as well as 
their high positive correlation suggest that the scale is measuring something similar to Moral 
Disengagement. Moral Consideration of War does not - if at all - solely reflect internalized 
moral standards because it includes some type of Moral Disengagement, too. Therefore, it is 
plausible that measuring Moral Consideration of War in the beginning of the study distorted 
the effects that were supposed to occur in this study (hypotheses 2a-6a). 
Strictly speaking, the abovementioned conclusion would prohibit further discussion about 
possible theoretical implications concerning the interaction terms of Moral Consideration of 
War. That is, because Bandura’s Socio Cognitive Theory of Morality (1999) as well as 
Social-Cognitive Model of Moral Behaviour by Aquino et al. (2009) rest upon the assumption 
that people have internalized moral standards on which moral behaviour is based on.  
Should the discussion stop here, since the true internalized moral standards of study 
participants are unknown?  
Remembering that internalized moral standards are a result of socialization, it can be argued 
that study participants underwent roughly the similar socialization processes. More general 
moral norms and standards can be considered fairly similar for all Germans: due to 
collectively traded experiences of World War I and II in school or through parents and grand-
parents; due to the experience of modern wars in Kosovo or Afghanistan in the news. If 
internalized moral standards concerning war are assumed the same for all study participants, 
the majority of them were German students, then discussion may proceed with regard to the 
main effects. Thereby, war is assumed to be immoral. Hence, the additional assumption is 
disregarded statistically only and not theoretically.  
5.4  DISCUSSION MAIN EFFECTS WITHOUT ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTION 
Concerning the support of war, regression analysis (model 1) suggested that only the 
Permissive Scenario had significant positive influence (B=6.23, SE=2.58, T (76) = 2.43, 
p=0.02, see Table 3). Moral Identity did not have significant effects on support of war 
(B=2.89, SE=2.58, T (76) = 1.10, p=0.27). Interaction effect of experimental variables was 
not significant (B=1.54, SE=2.58, T (76) =0.60, p=0.55), but Moral Consideration of War had 
a positive effect on support of war (B=12.22, SE=1.80, T (76) =6.80, p<0.01).  
Concerning Moral Disengagement, regression model 2 suggested that support of war had a 
significant positive influence (B < 0.01, SE<0.01, T (75) = 2.78, p=0.01, see Table 4). 
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Further, Moral Consideration of War had a positive effect (B = 0.23, SE=0.05, T (75) = 4.44, 
p<0.01 see Table 4). Moral Identity activation and Permissive Scenario had almost significant 
effects on Moral Disengagement. Moral Identity activation had a positive effect on Moral 
Disengagement (B=0.10, SE=0.06, T (75) =1.68, p=0.10, see Table 4). Permissive Scenario 
had a negative effect on Moral Disengagement (B= -0.10, SE=0.06, T (75) = -1.62, p=0.11, 
see Table 4). 
All significant main effects and almost significant (p=0.10 and p=0.11) main effects are 
illustrated in Figure 9. Almost significant effects are included because in a larger sample they 
are likely to reach level of significance of p<0.05 (Bortz & Döring, 2002).  
 
 
In the following, the focus is put on the discussion of main effects disregarding the additional 
assumption. Certainly these effects were not predicted in the hypotheses and some are not 
significant. Therefore, all theoretical conclusions will be made carefully. Subsection 5.4.1 will 
concentrate on Moral Disengagement and subsection 5.4.2 is about the hypotheses related to 
Moral Identity activation. 
Moral 
Identity 
Activation 
Permissive 
Scenario 
Support of 
War 
Moral 
Disengagement 
Moral 
Consideration 
of War 
+ 
+ 
(+) 
(-) + 
+ 
Experimental 
Time 
Figure 9: Overview of study results disregarding additional assumption statistically. +, - refer 
to the direction of the effect. Parentheses refer to almost significant effects. 
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5.4.1 MORAL DISENGAGEMENT  
The positive correlation between the outcome measures support of war and Moral 
Disengagement (questionnaire) is evident in this study when the additional assumption is 
disregarded (hypothesis 1a). This result confirms findings of prior studies (Aquino et al., 
2007; Bandura, 1999, 2002; Bandura et al., 1996; Cohrs, 2008; Detert et al., 2008; Jackson, 
2005b; Grussendorf et al., 2002; McAlister, 2001; McAlister et al., 2006).  
With regard to Moral Disengagement within media, fictive war scenarios written in news 
style were differentiated in their grade of permissiveness. In a Permissive Scenario all 
arguments based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria are 
included. Thus, the Permissive Scenario, in contrast to the Prohibitive Scenario, works as a 
positive reinforcement for support of war and triggers personal Moral Disengagement. It was 
predicted that a Permissive Scenario enhances support of war and therefore also Moral 
Disengagement (questionnaire) as compared to the Prohibitive Scenario. 
Referring to hypothesis 2a without the additional assumption, a Permissive Scenario increased 
the support of war expectedly. The Permissive Scenario as compared to the Prohibitive 
Scenario, had quantitatively more and qualitatively better arguments in favour of support of 
war. These arguments corresponded to Moral Disengagement mechanisms: firstly, all non-
military options were already exhausted and hence not useful anymore (‘ultima ratio’ criteria 
and ‘advantageous comparison’). Secondly, in the Permissive Scenario the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) granted permission for a military intervention (‘legitimization’ 
criteria and ‘displacement of responsibility’). This permission from the UNSC may be seen as 
an expert and a higher authority to which people are obedient (Milgram, 1975). Responsibility 
for possible immoral behaviour may be displaced to this higher authority (Bandura, 1999). 
Further, the decision of many countries in the UNSC diffuses responsibility among them and 
likewise the responsibility of possible negative consequences (military intervention). This 
diffusion of responsibility of immoral behaviour could have added to an increased support of 
war or at least counter the state of inaction that is usually found in groups due to diffusion of 
responsibility (Darley & Latané, 1968). Further, the UNSC functions as an expert in the topic 
of military interventions. Experts are said to be a strong argument and may have played a 
major role in the support of war, too (Stroebe, 2007). Thirdly, the probability of success for 
post-intervention peace was varied between the two scenarios. In the Permissive Scenario 
harmful consequences of a military intervention were ‘ignored and misconstrued’. This is as 
another mechanism of Moral Disengagement. In summary, Moral Disengagement 
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mechanisms within the Permissive Scenario increased the support of war. It is suggested that 
the arguments worked as a positive reinforcement for the individual support of war.  
Given on the one hand that the Permissive Scenario succeeded in increasing the support of 
war, it is striking that on the other hand it decreased Moral Disengagement (see hypothesis 3a 
without additional assumption). This effect was almost significant (p=0.11). Apparently, 
arguments that rest on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of Just War criteria in 
the Permissive Scenario did not trigger and enhance personal Moral Disengagement 
(questionnaire). Accordingly, it is difficult to estimate which kind of the arguments was most 
compelling to study participants, i.e. which Moral Disengagement mechanism worked best. 
Why did the Permissive Scenario not increase Moral Disengagement? 
One explanation is that the support of war was not considered immoral anymore because 
Moral Disengagement mechanisms were included in the prior read scenario. If war was 
justified in this specific case, there was no need to disengage later on as measured by Moral 
Disengagement questionnaire. This idea proposes that morality is different from situation to 
situation, in which the use of military force can be either right or wrong, moral or immoral. 
Maybe Moral Disengagement is already taken over by the Permissive Scenario reducing the 
need for each participant to disengage personally as measured by the subsequent Moral 
Disengagement questionnaire. Data reflects this consideration with an almost significant 
negative effect of Permissive Scenario on Moral Disengagement. To sum up, it is suggested 
that Moral Disengagement is taken over by the Permissive Scenario and consequently does 
not trigger personal Moral Disengagement. In fact, Permissive Scenario had a negative effect 
of Moral Disengagement which was almost significant (p=0.11).  
Internalized moral standards have not been taken into account in the explanations of this 
subsection. It is unknown if war was really considered immoral by the participants. Hence, 
conclusions on a more abstract level of immoral behaviour are refrained from in this case.  
5.4.2 MORAL IDENTITY 
Moral Identity activation was hypothesized to counter arguments that legitimize immoral 
behaviour (Moral Disengagement) and therefore indirectly reduce support of immoral 
behaviour (support of war; Aquino et al., 2007; Reed & Aquino, 2003). The results of this 
study reflect this only in parts even though manipulation check suggested success of Moral 
Identity activation. 
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Concerning hypothesis 4a without the additional assumption, Moral Identity activation 
increased Moral Disengagement in this study (p=0.10). However, Moral Identity and its 
activation were said to function as an instrument to counter arguments of Moral 
Disengagement: if Moral Identity was activated, internalized moral standards were said to be 
cognitively better accessible (Aquino et al., 2009). As a result, the circle of moral regard 
should have been more likely to be expanded and people should have taken into account the 
suffering of those officially labelled ‘enemies’ to a greater extent (Aquino et al., 2007). The 
circle of moral regard expansion should have reduced Moral Disengagement, because the 
‘others’ would have been humanized inside the circle (Aquino et al., 2007; Reed & Aquino, 
2003). However, Moral Identity activation was not negatively related to Moral 
Disengagement. Instead, it had an almost significant (p=0.10) positive effect in this study 
contradicting findings of studies by Reed and Aquino (2003), Aquino et al. (2007). 
A possible explanation can be found with hindsight to the extent to which participants support 
war. Moral Identity activation had no significant effect on support of war. As support of war 
was not zero, the average participant should have reason to disengage at least a little bit. It is 
plausible that Moral Identity activation increased participants’ inner urge to disengage from 
their support of war. This is because they are more aware of their internalized moral standards 
and that war is considered immoral. Hence, Moral Identity activation increased Moral 
Disengagement (p=0.10). Unfortunately, it is unknown if internalized moral standards of 
study participants considered war as immoral.  
Referring to hypothesis 7a without the additional assumption, Moral Identity activation had 
no direct effect on the support of war. This is reflected in studies by Aquino et al. (2007) and 
Aquino et al. (2009), too. Presumably, Moral Identity activation was not strong enough to 
make a direct difference in support of war (Aquino et al., 2009). The manipulation of Moral 
Identity was not targeted thematically at the immoral behaviour, i.e. Support of war. A study 
by Shu, Gino, & Bazerman (2011) shows that a stronger and thematically targeted 
manipulation of Moral Identity indeed succeeds in reducing immoral behaviour. In their study 
Moral Identity was activated by reading and signing an honour code which was thematically 
related to the dependent measure of cheating in a test (Shu et al., 2011). However, looking 
closer at the data, there are indeed differences that Moral Identity activation provoked in other 
remedies than the support of war (see annex, Table 6). Morally activated participants 
supported less severe remedies, i.e. ‘negotiations and observer missions’, to a significant 
greater extent than participants whose Moral Identity was not activated. Higher support of 
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‘negotiations and observer missions’ can be seen as something less violent than the support of 
war. This result provides evidence for theoretical considerations concerning Moral Identity. 
More generally speaking, Moral Identity activation did not succeed in reducing immoral 
behaviour (support of war), but instead increased moral behaviour (negotiations and observer 
missions). This conclusion is of course only valid if war is assumed to be immoral and 
‘negotiations and observer missions’ as moral.  
With regard to hypothesis 5a without the additional assumption, there is no evidence that 
Moral Identity in interaction with Permissive Scenario reduced the support of war. This effect 
is also not significant when taking the additional assumption into account. For hypothesis 5a 
conclusions on a theoretical level have a slightly stronger basis, since it did not make a 
difference whether the additional assumption was taken into account or not. It was predicted 
that Moral Identity activation reduces the reinforcing effect on support of war by arguments 
that justify war. Arguments were based on Moral Disengagement mechanisms and Theory of 
Just War criteria in the Permissive Scenario. Further, it was predicted that the Permissive 
Scenario cannot trigger personal Moral Disengagement due to the circle of moral regard 
expansion. Apparently, these functional predictions did not work sufficiently.  
The first possible explanation is that Moral Identity activation was neither strong enough nor 
thematically targeted enough to the context of war (see paragraphs above). Therefore, the 
predicted functional relationships were prevented. The second explanation relates to Moral 
Identity centrality. It has been shown in the studies by Aquino et al. (2009) that the effect of 
Moral Identity activation on Moral Disengagement and subsequent immoral behaviour 
depends on the trait variable Moral Identity centrality. Moral Identity centrality was measured 
at the end of this study (Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale by Reed & Aquino, 2003). 
However, the variable was not taken into account for the analysis since it was influenced by 
prior Moral Identity activation (see section 4.2). 
On a more abstract level, unexpectedly Moral Identity activation had a positive effect on 
moral behaviour. However, it did not interact with Moral Disengagement in media, reducing 
immoral behaviour. It was proposed that Moral Identity activation procedure would need to 
be stronger and targeted more specifically to the domain of the immoral behaviour (Aquino et 
al., 2009). This, however, would make the concept of Moral Identity less appealing because 
initially it was interesting due to its generality: that Moral Identity could be activated with 
general trait-related adjectives, interact with Moral Disengagement and, hence, reduce 
specific immoral behaviour (Aquino et al., 2007). Additionally, it is not clear in how far other 
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psychological mechanisms play a role when Moral Identity activation is targeted more 
specifically at the immoral behaviour. In summary, Moral Identity activation did not succeed 
to interact with Moral Disengagement in media diminishing immoral behaviour. Other ideas 
such as the web-based platform peacetest.org seem more promising to prevent Moral 
Disengagement and support of war (Howard, Shegog, Grussendorf, Benjamins, Stelzig, & 
McAlister, 2007).  
5.5  LIMITATIONS 
Limitations to this study with regard to the sample and methodology will be discussed in the 
following two subsections.  
5.5.1 SAMPLE 
This study intended to get participants from people of a wide political spectrum. Obviously 
the sample of this study was not representative for German population, since the sample had 
not been drawn randomly. In addition to it, most of the participants were students. With 
regard to political orientation, a clear majority of the study sample would have voted for the 
Green Party and held consequently more leftist political views than it would have been 
expected in a representative sample (see Figure 2).  
Further, the sample is a highly sophisticated one regarding knowledge on political topics. This 
is because most participants were recruited from two political student foundations which have 
political commitment as an inclusion criteria. Individuals who have a strong opinion on 
political topics are not only more likely to recognize which side of an issue is consistent with 
their beliefs, they are also more likely to counter argue information that is not consistent with 
their view (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Lodge & Taber, 2000; McGuire, 1964; Nelson et al., 
1997; Zaller, 1992). Arguments in the Permissive Scenario could have had a stronger effect 
on the support of war for people with a weaker political opinion. Therefore, the generalization 
of the results to a broader population with less political interest seems inadequate. Further, 
this fact may have led to the rejection of most of the hypotheses regarding Moral Identity 
activation. If a person has a clear and strong opinion on war, Moral Identity activation is not 
likely to make a significant change.  
A proportionally high drop-out rate of about 70 % was observed in this study leading to a 
relatively small sample for the regression models. The high number of participants leaving on 
the introductory page of the experiment suggests that these participants had little motivation 
to continue. Additional 88 participants left after the first page and before the last, most likely 
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due to the demanding tasks, high opportunity costs (e.g. watching a YouTube Video) and no 
costs for leaving the study. The study comprised two demanding tasks: undergoing Moral 
Identity activation and reading the Permissive or Prohibitive Scenario. On the one hand many 
participants could have felt objected to writing a story about personal moral behaviour. 
Writing the stories in the Moral Identity activation condition is thereby considered a more 
intimate and difficult task than for the control group. Here adjectives were more neutral and 
general, facilitating the completion of the task. It is possible that more people dropped out 
from Moral Identity activation condition than from control condition. On the other hand it is 
possible that many participants who saw the two-page newspaper article (Permissive and 
Prohibitive Scenario) did not continue the study because they were generally not interested in 
politics. Maybe the expected reading time was considered too long.  
These considerations lead to the two following conclusions: firstly, participants of this study 
are generally interested in politics. Secondly, participants were less objected to the Moral 
Identity activation task. In other words, study participants had been highly motivated to 
complete the experiment. This could have biased the results of this study because Moral 
Identity activation may work differently for highly motivated people. Plus, Moral Identity 
activation may work to a lesser extent for people with a high interest in politics and a clear 
and strong opinion about war. For future studies on war-related topics, traditional paper pencil 
formats may be a better alternative to online tools. This would prevent high drop-out rates and 
possible bias in the results.  
5.5.2 METHODS 
Methodical disadvantages and problems of the study have been discussed earlier already (see 
section 5.3). The measurement of internalized moral standards, in case of this study Moral 
Consideration of War, as a basis for Moral Disengagement and Moral Identity activation has 
been realized insufficiently. Implicit measures or proper explicit items could be an alternative 
to the Moral Consideration of War scale. Explicit items should measure internalized moral 
standards unconditionally, without direct and indirect Moral Disengagement. An example 
item could sound as follows: “how moral do you judge war, when only considering the act of 
war itself without its goals and reasons?” or “When you think of war, what kind of feeling 
comes to your mind first?”  
However, it seems quite possible that internalized moral standards include a Moral 
Disengagement mechanism already. For instance, one internalized moral standard could be: 
“war is legitimate if human rights violations are prevented” (‘moral justification’) or another 
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moral standard could state “war is illegitimate because humans are killed”. Internalized moral 
standards could comprise different standpoints on war, moral and immoral ones, already 
connected to a justification. This justification probably depends on individual socialization 
and learning. In this case the specific situation is important, i.e. which internalized moral 
standard (e.g. war is legitimate or illegitimate) is more accessible and influences behaviour 
most. Future studies on moral behaviour should take this into account. Generalizations from a 
specific behaviour to immoral behaviour should be made with more care as long as categories 
of moral and immoral behaviour are not clearly defined. With regard to Moral Disengagement 
mechanisms, it would be interesting to investigate if these mechanisms are used also for 
behaviour that is not commonly considered immoral, but for instance egoistic purposes or the 
like.  
An additional methodological obstacle was that the Terrorism Questionnaire (Jackson, 2005) 
was left in its original version and was not adapted to topic of the Permissive Scenario and 
Prohibitive Scenario. Study subjects may have been filling out this questionnaire next to last 
one without applying its contents to the prior scenario. This would partly explain why the 
Permissive Scenario had a negative (p=0.11) instead of a positive effect on Moral 
Disengagement (questionnaire). 
5.6  CONCLUSION 
War involves killing and devastation, whereby most of its victims are usually civilians 
(Hedges & Anfuso, 2003). These negative consequences are not always associated with war. 
Soldiers are highly appealed by the adrenaline of the battlefield (Hedges, 2002) and 
politicians want to protect human rights in foreign countries or defend economic interests. 
The factors that make war compelling or dissuasive are of interest for social and peace 
psychological research. Not least because military interventions namely in Afghanistan, 
Libya, Syria and other countries were repeatedly considered politically and discussed vividly 
in public. This study sought to contribute to this research by investigating: a) why do people 
support war? b) Which factors could possibly diminish this support? 
In summary, most of the theoretically derived hypotheses were rejected. The reasons were 
methodological shortcomings of the measurement of internalized moral standards concerning 
war (additional assumption). Further, it is possible that the high drop-out rate of the online 
experiment biased results. However, when abandoning the additional assumption statistically 
interesting results were found with regard to the first question: Moral Disengagement 
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mechanisms were positively related to the support of war (Aquino et al., 2007; Bandura, 
1999, 2002; Bandura et al., 1996; Cohrs, 2008; Detert et al., 2008; Jackson, 2005b; 
Grussendorf et al., 2002; McAlister, 2001; McAlister et al., 2006). When Moral 
Disengagement is included in media it has a reinforcing effect on individual support of war 
(Meyer, 1972), but does not trigger individual Moral Disengagement as expected (Cohrs, 
2008). However, these findings are valid only on the assumption that internalized moral 
standards judge war as immoral. Because this is by no means granted, further research should 
concentrate on the exact content of internalized moral standards in different domains. It 
should be taken into account that justification could already be part of those standards. 
Further, it would be interesting to investigate if Moral Disengagement works also for moral 
behaviour. This is theoretically important since internalized moral standards are a basis for 
Moral Disengagement (Bandura, 1991, 1999) and Moral Identity activation alike (Aquino et 
al., 2009).  
With regard to the second question, however, Moral Identity activation unexpectedly did not 
reduce Moral Disengagement. Moral Identity activation failed to diminish support of war by 
countering arguments of Moral Disengagement in media. Apparently, the expansion of the 
circle of moral regard, due to Moral Identity activation, did not succeed as proposed by 
studies of Aquino et al. (2007) as well as Reed and Aquino (2003). There is evidence that 
mediators, such as Moral Identity centrality, could affect the relationship between Moral 
Identity activation and Moral Disengagement. Additionally, Moral Identity activation needs to 
be targeted directly at the immoral behaviour (Aquino et al., 2009; Shu et al., 2011). Future 
research should not refrain from investigating the relationship between Moral Identity and 
support of war, so that tragedies of war are not forgotten. Since war is as old as humanity, it 
will be still important to find peaceful conflict solutions in the future.  
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7 ANNEX 
Table 5: Preference of Remedies for Permissive Scenario and Prohibitive Scenario 
 Remedies Scenario N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
F (1,84) 
No remedies Prohibitive Scenario 45 24.13 32.13 0.06 
 Permissive Scenario 41 22.46 31.47  
 Total 86 23.34 31.64  
Negotiations and 
observer missions 
Prohibitive Scenario 45 85.56 22.55 0.21 
 Permissive Scenario 41 83.27 23.54  
 Total 86 84.47 22.92  
Economic sanctions 
and diplomatic 
pressure 
Prohibitive Scenario 45 75.73 30.94 0.00 
Permissive Scenario 41 75.68 30.45  
 Total 86 75.71 30.53  
Military remedies Prohibitive Scenario 45 30.56* 27.43 3.31 
 Permissive Scenario 41 42.02* 31.07  
 Total 86 36.02 29.61  
*significant, p<0.05; differences were tested in a single one-way ANOVA using different 
remedies as dependent variables and Scenario (Permissive and Prohibitive) as independent 
factor addressing alpha error accumulation of multiple testing.  
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Table 6: Preference of Remedies for Moral Identity Activation and Control Group 
Remedies Moral Identity Activation N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
F (1,84) 
No remedies Control Group 45 26.53 32.63 0.96 
 Moral Identity Activation 41 19.83 30.53  
 Total 86 23.34 31.64  
Negotiations and 
observer missions 
Control Group 45 78.64* 25.71 6.48 
Moral Identity Activation 41 90.85* 17.58  
Total 86 84.47 22.92  
Economic sanctions and 
diplomatic pressure 
Control Group 45 77.78 29.12 0.43 
Moral Identity Activation 41 73.44 32.21  
Total 86 75.71 30.53  
Military remedies Control Group 45 34.69 29.86 0.19 
 Moral Identity Activation 41 37.49 29.63  
 Total 86 36.02 29.61  
*significant, p<0.05; differences were tested in one-way ANOVA using different remedies as 
dependent variables and Moral Identity activation as independent factor addressing alpha error 
accumulation of multiple testing.  
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Table 7: Moral Disengagement Mechanisms as Measured by Terrorism Questionnaire in 
German (Jackson, 2005) 
Items N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
1. Es ist unverantwortlich auf den Einsatz militärischer Mittel zu 
verzichten, wenn dadurch ein Beitrag zum Frieden auf der Welt 
geleistet werden kann (Moral justification). 
85 2.71 1.13 
2. Wenn friedliche Mittel einen Konflikt nicht effektiv zu lösen 
vermögen, halte ich den Einsatz militärischer Interventionskräfte für 
gerechtfertigt (Palliative comparison). 
85 3.02 1.14 
3. In schnellen und sauberen militärischen Aktionen können heutzutage 
zentrale Stützpunkte feindlicher Bewegungen neutralisiert und 
Kollateralschäden minimiert werden (Euphemistic labelling). 
85 2.74 1.11 
4. Wenn ein Soldat im Krieg jemanden tötet, handelt er im Auftrag von 
militärischen Befehlen und trägt folglich keinerlei persönliche 
moralische Verantwortung für sein Tun (Displacement of 
responsibility). 
85 2.19 1.14 
5. Wenn die Nato uns um militärische Hilfe bittet, um einen Konflikt 
im Ausland zu beenden, bin ich für den Einsatz bewaffneter Truppen 
im Krisengebiet (Diffusion of responsibility). 
85 2.41 1.07 
6. In the struggle for peace I find the use of military force justified if 
death of innocent people is avoided (Minimizing, ignoring or 
misconstruing the consequences) 
85 3.27 1.13 
7. Menschen, die Andere im Krieg grausam behandeln sind 
Unmenschen. Man muss ihnen schonungslos begegnen 
(Dehumanization). 
85 2.62 1.18 
8. Wenn sich extreme politische Gruppierungen grausamer Verbrechen 
gegen die Menschheit und schwerer Verletzungen der Menschenrechte 
schuldig gemacht haben, haben sie keine militärische Schonung 
verdient (Attribution of blame) 
85 2.86 1.20 
Average Moral Disengagement 85 2.73 0.72 
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Table 8: Means of Moral Disengagement Mechanisms for Moral Identity Activation and 
Control Group 
Moral Disengagement 
Mechanism 
Moral Identity Activation N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
F (1,83) 
1. Moral Justification Control Group 44 2.68 1.20 0.04 
 Moral Identity Activation 41 2.73 1.07  
 Total 85 2.71 1.13  
2. Palliative 
Comparison 
Control Group 44 2.80 1.21 3.74 
Moral Identity Activation 41 3.27 1.03  
 Total 85 3.02 1.14  
3. Euphemistic 
Labelling 
Control Group 44 2.61 1.22 1.20 
Moral Identity Activation 41 2.88 0.98  
 Total 85 2.74 1.12  
4. Displacement of 
Responsibility 
Control Group 44 2.23 1.14 0.11 
Moral Identity Activation 41 2.15 1.15  
 Total 85 2.19 1.14  
5. Diffusion of 
Responsibility 
Control Group 44 2.23 1.08 2.76 
Moral Identity Activation 41 2.61 1.05  
 Total 85 2.41 1.07  
6. Minimizing; 
Ignoring Consequences 
Control Group 44 3.02* 1.21 4.60 
Moral Identity Activation 41 3.54* 0.98  
 Total 85 3.27 1.13  
7. Dehumanization Control Group 44 2.59 1.17 0.07 
 Moral Identity Activation 41 2.66 1.22  
 Total 85 2.62 1.19  
8. Attribution of Blame Control Group 44 2.80 1.27 0.25 
Moral Identity Activation 41 2.93 1.13  
 Total 85 2.86 1.20  
*significant, p<0.05; differences were tested in one-way ANOVA using Moral Disengagement 
mechanisms as dependent variables and Moral Identity activation as independent factor. 
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Table 9: Means of Moral Disengagement Mechanisms for Permissive Scenario and 
Prohibitive Scenario 
Moral Disengagement 
Mechanism 
Scenario N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
F(1,83) 
1. Moral Justification Prohibitive Scenario 44 2.80 1.13 0.57 
Permissive Scenario 41 2.61 1.14  
 Total 85 2.71 1.13  
2. Palliative Comparison Prohibitive Scenario 44 3.02 1.23 0.00 
Permissive Scenario 41 3.02 1.06  
 Total 85 3.02 1.14  
3. Euphemistic 
Labelling  
Prohibitive Scenario 44 2.82 1.00 0.43 
Permissive Scenario 41 2.66 1.24  
 Total 85 2.74 1.11  
4. Displacement of 
Responsibility 
Prohibitive Scenario 44 2.34 1.33 1.65 
Permissive Scenario 41 2.02 0.88  
 Total 85 2.19 1.14  
5. Diffusion of 
Responsibility  
Prohibitive Scenario 44 2.61 1.10 3.32 
Permissive Scenario 41 2.20 1.01  
 Total 85 2.41 1.07  
6. Minimizing; Ignoring 
Consequences 
Prohibitive Scenario 44 3.20 1.15 0.31 
Permissive Scenario 41 3.34 1.11  
 Total 85 3.27 1.13  
7. Dehumanization  Prohibitive Scenario 44 2.66 1.16 0.08 
 Permissive Scenario 41 2.59 1.22  
 Total 85 2.62 1.19  
8. Attribution of Blame  Prohibitive Scenario 44 2.93 1.17 0.34 
Permissive Scenario 41 2.78 1.24  
 Total 85 2.86 1.20  
*significant, p<0.05, tested with one-way ANOVA using Moral Disengagement mechanisms 
as dependent variables and Scenario (Permissive and Prohibitive) as independent factor 
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Table 10: Manipulation Check 
“I feel as a…” Moral Identity N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation F(1,85) 
student Control Group 45 4.69 1.99 0.60 
 
Moral Identity Activation 41 4.32 2.46  
 
Total 86 4.51 2.22  
part of an association or 
organisation 
Control Group 45 3.80 2.15 1.47 
Moral Identity Activation 41 3.22 2.29  
 
Total 86 3.52 2.22  
moral person Control Group 45 4.27* 1.88 20.89 
 
Moral Identity Activation 41 5.83* 1.18  
 
Total 86 5.01 1.76  
safety conscious Control Group 45 3.71 2.04 0.95 
 
Moral Identity Activation 41 3.29 1.93  
 
Total 86 3.51 1.99  
*significant, p<0.05; tested in a single one-way ANOVA with Moral Identity activation as 
independent factor and “I feel as a…” for dependent variables.  
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Table 11: Means, Standard Deviations and Items in German for Moral Consideration of War 
Scale 
Item N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Krieg kann ethisch gerechtfertigt sein, um Terrorismus zu 
bekämpfen 
86 3.19 1.93 
Der Einsatz militärischer Gewalt missachtet die Regeln 
eines zivilen Zusammenlebens (invertiert). 
86 2.65 1.70 
Krieg ist grundsätzlich moralisch verwerflich (invertiert). 
86 3.21 1.87 
Krieg kann ethisch gerechtfertigt sein, um Freiheit und 
Menschenrechte zu schützen. 
86 4.42 1.83 
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Table 12: Internalization Subscale of Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale in German 
(Reed & Aquino, 2003)  
Items N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Es würde mir ein gutes Gefühl geben, eine Person mit diesen 
Eigenschaften zu sein. 
85 4.59 0.73 
Ich trage oft Kleidung, die mich als jemanden auszeichnet, der 
diese Eigenschaften besitzt. 
85 2.66 1.16 
Ich würde mich schämen, eine Person mit solchen Eigenschaften 
zu sein. 
85 4.78 0.73 
Diese Eigenschaften zu besitzen ist nicht wirklich wichtig für 
mich. 
85 4.32 1.05 
Ich wünsche es mir sehr, diese Eigenschaften zu haben. 
 
85 4.14 1.14 
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7.1 OPERATIONALIZATION PERMISSIVE SCENARIO (GERMAN) 
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7.2 OPERATIONALIZATION PROHIBITIVE SCENARIO (GERMAN) 
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7.3 STUDY DESCRIPTION FOR PARTICIPANTS (GERMAN) 
 
Liebe/r VersuchsteilnehmerIn,  
vielen Dank, dass Sie an dieser Studie teilnehmen. Im Rahmen meiner Diplomarbeit 
beschäftige ich mich mit dem Thema Krieg und der Unterstützung von Krieg. Dafür benötige 
ich Ihre Mithilfe beim Ausfüllen dieses Online Surveys. Dies dauert kurzweilige 20 Minuten. 
Sollten Sie an den Ergebnissen der Studie interessiert sein, bitte ich Sie auf der letzten Seite 
ihre Emailadresse zu hinterlassen. Diese wird separat von Ihren Daten gespeichert, denn die 
Erhebung erfolgt anonym. D.h. es werden keine Namen, keine IP-Adressen oder Ähnliches 
gespeichert.  
 
Bitte beenden Sie für die nächsten 10-15 Minuten alle Hintergrundprogramme Ihres Browsers 
und PCs. Sie sollten Musik bitte ausschalten und sich in einer ruhigen, störungsfreien 
Umgebung befinden. Am rechten oberen Bildrand sehen Sie einen Balken, der den Fortschritt 
des Ausfüllens anzeigt. Weiter geht es mit dem Button rechts unten in der Ecke.  
 
Bitte beantworten Sie die Fragen ehrlich. Sollten Sie sich einmal nicht sicher bei der 
Beantwortung sein, folgen Sie ihrer ersten Intuition und ihrem Bauchgefühl. Es gibt dabei 
keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten.  
 
Zunächst füllen Sie bitte ein paar Angaben zu sich selbst aus. Danach folgen allgemeine 
Einstellungsfragen bezogen auf Krieg. Dann sollen Sie eine kleine Geschichte über sich selbst 
schreiben, gefolgt von einem hypothetischen Kriegsszenario, zu dem ich gern Ihre Meinung 
wüsste. Für alle Interessierte gibt es am Ende noch nähere Hinweise zum Aufbau, Idee und 
Zweck meiner Diplomarbeit.  
 
Noch einmal vielen Dank für die Teilnahme an der Studie und viel Spaß! 
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